Military Intelligence

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

Features

Military Intelligence

From the Home of Intelligence

Departments

Staff

from the
Commander

by Maj. Gen. Sidney T. Weinstein

The capstone of national decision making in contemporary society is a vigorous intelligence effort. Strategic Intelligence provides material for the formulation of policies at the national and multinational level. Here, emphasis is placed on a nation's geography, sociology, national resources, industrial capacity, armed forces and political system. Quite obviously the factors of Strategic Intelligence are founded in national and/or social sciences. By analyzing these factors, a nation's military capabilities and vulnerabilities are determined.

By all standards, the Soviet Union clearly constitutes the most significant threat to our national security. Tough strategic realities will continue to confront us as we enter the 21st century. The proliferation of nuclear arms and the application of modern technologies to the art of war will arrest our attention. We must also accurately discern strategic intentions not only on the AirLand Battlefield but also in near earth and outer space. The ultimate test of the true worth of Strategic Intelligence will rest in the avoidance of war.

We at the Center and School understand our function in the Strategic Intelligence arena and expect that role to continue and also grow. New training for the selected MI Officer Advance Course students will begin in the second quarter in FY 85. Designated officers will attend a 10-week Advance Strategic Intelligence Track Course with a follow-on six-week Assignment Specific Module of Instruction at the Defense Intelligence College.

Comments and inquiries from readers are always welcome. Again, we value open lines of communication with our field constituency.

HOME OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

from the
CSM

by CSM Sammy W. Wise

Military intelligence is undergoing some of its most dynamic changes in recent history. The realities of AirLand Battle Doctrine force us to broaden our areas of interest on today's battlefield, and make the job of intelligence gathering more complex than ever before. Concurrently, the Army of Excellence concept is demanding we do more with less. It challenges us to maximize our capabilities and resources under dire threat of mission failure for misutilization or mismanagement. Add to this the rampant influx of high technology and we create the environment that senior NCOs must work in today.

I submit to you that if we are to continue to provide sustained, quality performance on the job, we must be flexible in our thinking. We will often have to make personal adjustments in our attitudes, some more than others. We must accept new ways of doing business and the new ideas they carry with them. We are going to be burning the midnight oil and constantly educating ourselves in practically all aspects of military intelligence. I will make it my top priority to use all available lines of communication to keep you abreast of events as they happen. Here are selected samplings of the type of changes we can expect in the near future.

CMF Restructure. The most visible and immediate changes we can anticipate will result from the CMF 33, 96 and 98 restructure actions. Cosmetic changes will probably occur first. MOS 96C and 05G will be renumbered 97E and 97G, respectively. MOS 17K and 17M will merge and become 96D. Later, MOS 96F, Psychological Warfare Operations Specialist, will be created. 97B10 personnel should again be in the inventory. The 96B will become the all-source analyst. Some MOSs that now cap at E7 will stovepipe through to E8 and E9. I have listed only a few of the forthcoming changes to give you some idea of the scope of this restructure action.

The CMF 33 restructure was approved by the DCSPER on January 5, 1984, and the plans for implementation are well underway. MOS 33S has been divided into five MOSs: 33T, 33R, 33M, 33P, and 33Q. Each new MOS is a more distinct and attainable mission. In December of this year, a DA-convened panel will reclassify all personnel holding MOS 33S into one of the five new MOSs. Guidelines for reclassification are being listed in priority of consideration as: (1) training and experience, (2) personal preference, and (3) current assignment. MILPERCEN letters are being forwarded to all 33S soldiers alerting them to this action.

It is imperative that we acquaint ourselves with all aspects of this massive restructuring action as they are approved for implementation. We will be required to train and retrain these "new" soldiers with the same expertise as before; they have the right to expect it, and we have a clear obligation to do it.

New Warrant Officer Accession Policy. A new warrant officer accession policy will be in effect on October 1, 1984. No longer will enlisted personnel be directly appointed to warrant officer. They will have to meet tough, new application criteria. If qualified, they will attend a six-week warrant officer candidate course, followed by a resident common MI and technical course at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., and other locations. Appointment authority has been decentralized to the Commanding General, USAICS, for MI warrants. This new policy will provide us warrant officers who have been trained to the proponent's high technical standards prior to their first assignment.

TAADS Scrub. There will be an early requirement for us to closely examine our manning documents. They must accurately reflect the people and grade structure needs of our unit, while at the same time support the Armywide posture of any given MOS. We must come to grips with the reality that some MI units tend to be overgraded. We can no longer afford that luxury. As the people responsible for "getting the job done," we will have to prepare our junior soldiers to assume greater roles, and then demonstrate to them our confidence in their abilities to meet these greater expectations. To facilitate your efforts, we are committed here at the Center and School, through our training and soldierization programs, to provide you with highly-trained, motivated soldiers. But you must remember, they are skill level one soldiers, and must be received as such.

I sincerely hope that even these few examples will impress upon you that we are indeed part of a fast-moving, rapidly-changing Army—an Army that challenges us to be effective leaders, competent trainers, and efficient managers. I am thoroughly convinced that the NCOs of MI will face this challenge with the same daring and enthusiasm that they have faced all challenges throughout our proud history.

TAKE CARE OF THE SOLDIERS.

Editor:

As the former commander of one the first CEWI battalions, the 313th with the 82d Airborne Division, I would like to comment on Maj. Skelton's letter in the January/March (1984) issue of MI. Whether we call our battalions MI or CEWI battalions is now academic. The Army decided on the term MI battalions and that is that. The term CEWI first appeared in the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (IOSS) in 1974, when the Army Chief of Staff directed that the former Army Security Agency (ASA) and military intelligence be integrated. The term CEWI, using small letters in its spelling, was used to denote the integrated ASA and MI units then existing and was never intended as a unit title. Brig. Gen. Kelly, then the Commandant of the Intelligence Center and School, suggested to TRADOC in 1977 that the newly integrated intelligence units resulting from IOSS be called military intelligence battalions and groups. General DuPuy, commander of TRADOC, responded emphatically that these new units would be called CEWI battalions and that EW would proceed the I. His intent was not to convey that EW was more important than intelligence, but that EW would not be subordinate to intelligence.

This idea still carries merit today. General DuPuy is a remarkable individual, he knew first-hand the lessons of the 1973 Mid-East War and knew that EW and intelligence had to be integrated to win in modern battle. He wanted that premise embodied in the unit title—CEWI. The units were named after a concept rather than after a branch. Hence, the term CEWI in capital letters was coined.

Later, the DA DCSOPNS supported the institutionalization of the term CEWI, DA ACSI preferred the term MI but went belly-up during the DA staffing process and acceded to the term CEWI. Ironically, it was the DA Office of Military History that was responsible for making the title "MI Battalions" stick, but for all the wrong reasons. They refused to approve crest or colors for the new battalions (this went on for two years) until the units were named after a branch. As the name implies the Office of Military History lives in history, is comfortable there, knows more about the war of 1812 than 1973, and has a missionary zeal to retard any new idea which may impact on lineage and honors. As we learned, if you're

not careful, you can get bashed with their ideological canes. This small office successfully stymied a major DA reorganization mostly because they could afford to concentrate with all their zeal on this comparatively trivial issue while others had to concentrate on running the Army. We gave up on CEWI, and as Maj. Skelton indicated in his letter, Exxon didn't.

Maj. Skelton's second issue involving organization of these battalions is of greater concern. Whether MI battalions eventually organize with multidisciplined brigade support companies, or be comprised of functional companies, is a decision to be made by today's leaders. There are arguments for both, but I think Maj. Skelton presented the wrong arguments. The problem is that the H-series TOE was originally designed and intended (in 1977) to serve as a transition TOE in order to expedite the integration of ASA, MI, sensor, and similar units and their compounded logistic and personnel problems into battalions and to do so quickly. It was chiefly because Series H was ideal for garrison that it was initially adopted—better training, better logistics, better utilization of scarce personnel. It was never intended to go to war with series H. Maj. Paluska was right on target with his article last year. We got lazy, we got more concerned with passing inspections than training to fight, Series H lived too long. Series J does little to improve the situation. To paraphrase Napoleon, you organize to fight (not to train) or more recently quoting Col. Stephen J. Silvasy, Jr., Commander of the 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, in the Christian Science Monitor, "We plan on fighting like we train." Sound ideas then, sound ideas now. It's about time we ask ourselves why the rest of the Army, with considerable experience, organizes one way (signal and artillery are good models), while MI screws around studying everything into oblivion. It is still my opinion that a CEWI battalion commander spends more time defending his TOE than training to fight.

Things could be worse, the Army could recommend reducing the size of

CEWI battalions by half expecting the CEWI groups at corps to send direct support element to division when needed (as opposed to providing general support).

The Office of Military History, or whomever, is probably contending that the chief lesson of the Grenada Campaign is that corps CEWI, (oops!), MI groups are too small and divisional battalions are too large.

Enough of that, back to my fishing.

Don E. Gordon
Col., U.S. Army (Retired)

Editor:

(In reference to Maj. John D. Skelton's letter in the January-March 1984 issue of Military Intelligence:)

"To CEWI or not to CEWI?" The question is of little interest. The primary concern is are the EW systems now deployed mission capable?

The secondary concern is with the intermingling of the signal MOSs with MI MOSs in the battalion. MI personnel know as much about signal, as signal knows about MI. This is also true between the division signal battalion and the division MI battalion. One hand rarely knows what the other is doing.

Now, here's the clincher. Rather than haggling over the "CEWI" name, why not put CEWI as part of the division signal battalion? This way, you maximize the collection effort with the communication effort and utilize the most efficient means of dissemination of intelligence.

Capt. James B. Kerr
Signal Corps
Commander, Service Support Company, 522nd MI Battalion
2nd Armored Division
Fort Hood, Texas

Editor:

The 2nd Armored Division Museum is looking for information and photos from the various units which served in Korea and Vietnam. These units were the 2nd Squadron, 1st Cavalry; 1st Battalion, 14th Field Artillery; 17th Engineer Battalion; 1st Battalion, 92nd Field Artillery; 5th Battalion, 46th Armored Infantry Regiment; and the 1st Battalion, 50th Armored Infantry Regiment.

The information and photos can be copied and the originals returned. The material will be used in the new exhibits being constructed for the museum. Call commercial (817) 287-8811/8812 or Autovon 737-8811/8812.

Paul Beck
2nd Armored Division Museum,
P.O. Box 5009,
Fort Hood, TX 76546.

Editor:

Several years ago, when I branch transferred to armor in the USAR and accepted a civilian position in the wacky world of ordnance intelligence, I gave up my subscription to Military Intelligence.

I just ran across the January-March 1983 issue with the article "C³I=CEWI," pages 8, 10 and 11, by Maj. Donald McCuish. I thought it was an excellent article, especially the part on the technical intelligence team—see my article "Notes from the Past" in the January-March and April-June 1979 issues of Military Intelligence, as well as the article by Capt. James H. Cox, Jr., on "Technical Intelligence Support of the OPFOR Program" (October-December 1977).

At the present, I am on a 60-day tour at First Army working on getting the Consolidated Training Facility at Fort Dix off the ground. It looks like a lot of work is being done to improve the training of

USAR MI personnel, but it is very late. I am reminded of Gen. McChristian's comments on Vietnam, "Sadly we would relearn those lessons we learned in World War II and forgot." Very soon the combat experienced Vietnam vets will be gone from the system, and we can begin again from square one on technical intelligence. And again we will send men and women into combat with poor weapons and continue to develop the wrong systems at an ever increasing cost.

Lt. Col. William L. Howard
Armor, USAR
Spring Lake Heights, N.J.

Training Hotline

The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Ariz., has a Training Hotline which can receive telephone queries regarding USAICS, Fort Huachuca, actions, programs, and products from anywhere in the world 24-hours a day.

- Does your unit ARTEP contain all critical tasks actually performed and identify all performance objectives required of your unit?

- Does Soldiers Manual for your MOSC contain all the tasks you are required to perform?

- In your opinion was your Skill Qualification Test valid, and did it contain only the material that pertains to your MOSC?

- Are sufficient TEC materials available to allow you to study and/or train your MOSC skills?

- Does the OPFOR program meet your unit's needs and are sufficient OPFOR materials available for your training?

- Do you know what the technical support package is?

If the answer to any to these questions is **No**, then call the Training Hotline. You can help yourself, your unit, and the Army improve our training posture, individually and collectively. Feel free to call the Training Hotline and give us your recommendations for intelligence training improvement or your training problems. The key to developing effective, valid training materials lies in field units where constructive feedback and criticism from users are generated.

To use Training Hotline, dial AUTOVON 879-3609 or commercial (602) 538-3609. Your message will be recorded automatically, so be sure to give your name, unit, telephone number, and clearly state your message. Please limit your call to three minutes. Compose your message beforehand to ensure it contains all the necessary facts. Your recorded message will be acted upon either the same day or the first duty day following your call. You will be provided a response, either preliminary or complete, within five duty days.

Users are invited and encouraged to take the initiative in improving intelligence training products and methods. Use the Training Hotline, call the responsible USAICS element direct, or write: Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, ATTN: ATSI-TD, Fort Huachuca, Ariz. 85613.

THE STRATEGIC DEBRIEFER

Human sources, particularly defectors, refugees, travelers, resettlers, and returned or escaped U.S. or friendly nationals, are some of the most lucrative sources of intelligence. However, the proper exploitation of these sources requires thoroughly trained debriefers. The popular belief among many in the military that "anyone can ask questions" is true in theory, but totally false in the business of debriefing.

Debriefing is an art of questioning and examining an individual in a strategic environment to obtain the maximum amount of usable information in response to national collection requirements. The overall objective of any debriefing is to obtain information of the highest degree of credibility, in the minimum amount of time, to satisfy the intelligence requirements at any echelon of command. Specific objectives are based on national collection requirements and directives issued by all national-level agencies and major commands.

Strategic debriefers of all services are important contributors to our national collection effort. Today, they are thoroughly trained to effectively exploit human and materiel sources that are of potential intelligence interest. They are located worldwide at a variety of MI units. Strategic debriefers are selected as much for their personal qualities as for their special skills and abilities.

The strategic debriefer must possess a keen interest in human nature and have personality characteristics which will enable him or her to gain the confidence and cooperation of sources. The latter is a key element of debriefing because, unlike interrogation, sources selected for debriefing are not normally required to participate. Ideally, many of these personality traits are inherent in a strategic debriefer. If any deficiencies do exist, hard work, coupled with desire and practice, will usually overcome most problems. Other traits desirable in a strategic debriefer are motivation, alertness, patience, tact, credibility, self-control, and the ability to operate independently in a worldwide scenario.

The strategic debriefer must also possess, or acquire through training and experience, a number of special skills and at least some degree of expertise in a diversity of scientific and technical fields. He or she must be able to prepare and present written and oral reports in a clear, concise and accurate manner. Debriefing is not an end in itself—the full value of intelligence gained in this manner can be realized only after it has been accurately disseminated, in a usable form, to the appropriate consumers.

Although strategic debriefers are trained to work with U.S. sources, most of their work involves non-U.S. personnel. For this reason, it is preferred that each strategic debriefer be fluent in at least one foreign language. In addition, the strategic debriefer must be familiar with the psychological makeup of the people in a target country, as well as their customs, culture, and history. As previously stated, the nature of the strategic debriefer's mission requires that he or she possess detailed and varied knowledge in numerous scientific and technical subjects, as well as a solid base of knowledge in all types of tactical information. Strategic debriefers are competitive and dedicated individuals, working long and irregular hours, many times at great distances from their assigned units. They are not only responsible for locating their sources, but for arranging and conducting the debriefing and preparing the proper reports. Additionally, the flexibility of altering the prescribed framework of the debriefing to suit irregular circumstances is a critical responsibility.

Debriefing is a continuous cycle which demands maximum effort. The strategic debriefer is an integral aspect of our national strategic intelligence structure. ★

The need for advanced debriefing and interrogation training was validated by a DIA study conducted in 1981. A Strategic Debriefer Course was developed by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., following a September 1982 Memorandum of Agreement which gave the Army the proponency for development and presentation. The Strategic Debriefer Course is designed to accommodate commissioned officers, warrant officers, enlisted and civilian personnel from all services and from other intelligence agencies, as required. The course is assignment oriented. Students attending may already be assigned or be on orders to strategic debriefing activities. Further information on the Strategic Debriefer Course can be found in the January-March 1984 issue of Military Intelligence, or by calling the Chief, Exploitation Division at Autovon 879-5272/3837.

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The
KAL
INCIDENT

by Lt. Col. David T. Twining

The tragic downing of an unarmed civilian airliner over the Sea of Japan on September 1, 1983 shocked public sensibilities like no other event since the December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. Even now, one year after the deaths of 269 crew and passengers, there is no acceptable justification for this act of senseless violence.[1]

That such wanton murder could happen at all seems incredible; that Moscow did not offer an apology to assuage an outraged world stands as a harsh indictment of totalitarian morality. The event, when viewed against the backdrop of larger humanitarian and national interests, contains key messages to U.S. Army military intelligence professionals.

Lethality of the Modern Battlefield

Sir John Hackett's (et. al.) book, The Third World War, provided a glimpse of a violent, lethal battlefield where target servicing and high casualties are synonymous. Defense planners of both East and West accept that a future conflict between major adversaries armed with high technology weapons will produce battlefield conditions as chaotic, turbulent and violent as the world has ever seen.

Along with this lethality is a growing recognition that the threshold beyond which nuclear weapons may be employed is becoming increasingly difficult to clearly perceive. The danger of the premature or unnecessary use of nuclear weapons on a battlefield obscured by smoke, special munitions, electronic warfare, rapid movement and uncertain lines is a real one.[2] An adversary alerted to an approaching flight of cruise missiles may not wait for their impact to determine whether they are nuclear or conventionally armed. When the smoke clears and the radiation remains, the cause may have been the obscurity of combat operations and conditions by the unprecedented lethality and violence of a new generation of conventional weapons.

The Soviet Union and Military Affairs

Given the heightened lethality of conventional weaponry and an indistinct nuclear threshold, the KAL 747 incident has shifted attention to the Soviet Union, a country where military power is the best product of an oligarchic political system which essentially missed the leavening influence of the Renaissance and the Reformation, where its 272 million citizens[3] are isolated from liberal influences of the West, and where military power is as central to foreign affairs as police power is to internal cohesion.

As a mobilized political system, where the people are prepared to serve the interest of the state, rather than a participative system, with its focus on individual instead of "collective" rights,[4] this emphasis on military power inevitably leads to situations where armed force may be inappropriately used, for example, against an unarmed civilian airliner.

A country cannot have the largest air defense network, the largest surface and submarine fleet, the largest intelligence and espionage network, and the most militarized society in the world without misfortune occurring. Citizens and soldiers alike cannot be harangued against threats, foreign and domestic, without a situation arising to which force is routinely applied as a standard operating procedure.[5] Peacetime rules of engagement bear little difference from wartime rules when a mobilized society is placed on a semi-war footing against apparent enemies everywhere.

Moral Drift of the Contemporary Era

The feeling of incredulity with which the world watched the unfolding events of September First have faded to sublime indifference. To much of the world, the incident is now viewed as another unfortunate experience of a contemporary life imbued with acts of barbarism and inhumanity. The KAL 747 shootdown served for but a moment to focus attention on the inappropriate application of instruments of sudden death against helpless civilian targets.

The moral fiber of the present era has already been tested by the disappearance of more than two million Kampucheans since 1970; the Sverdlovsk incident, where as many as 1,000 Soviet citizens perished when anthrax escaped from a secret biological warfare laboratory; the Yellow Rain deaths, where tragedy upon tragedy has desensitized the world to apparent practices of chemical warfare long prohibited by international convention; and the systemic repression of human rights from Poland to Cuba to Vietnam.

Many view the creeping violence of the contemporary world as evidence of man's inherent barbarism, while others see such events as remote to their lives, observed through the magic of television but never experienced by real people. It is the irony of the present era that telecommunications can bring into our homes images of death in distant lands, but the mind seems incapable of accepting either the personal danger or the larger human tragedy it represents.

Lesson for Army MI Professionals

The lesson for military intelligence professionals is that preparedness must now take on a new meaning. Instead of having to await the process of consensus building as in the early days of World War II or its disintegration as in the Vietnam experience, Army professionals must provide the intelligence support required for a more immediate

response to the kind of instant calamity to vital national interests made possible by the new generation of modern weapons in the hands of totalitarian governments. As long as the destruction of an off-course civilian airliner is treated as business as usual by a militaristic state intent on preserving its territorial prerogatives at any cost, Western leaders, crisis managers and their military forces require intelligence of potential and developing incidents which these vast armed forces make possible.

Despite the increasing lethality with which we are daily faced, the prospect of arms control—long an American policy—must be reflected upon anew. It is in everyone's interest to control armaments and to reduce the danger of an accidental or irresponsible use of armed force which could lead to a larger conflagration. U.S. experience has shown that the imperative of arms control only gains Moscow's attention when it is pursued from a position of strength or technological advantage—building or threatening to build new weapons before efforts for their control are taken seriously. This unfortunate reality has placed NATO in the position of having to deploy Pershing IIs and GLCMs on European soil before progress may be possible in talks to reduce the SS-20 threat. It also requires intelligence to support verification and to define threat developments for national arms control efforts.

The key to this new preparedness and the imperative for arms control is the centrality of military intelligence as the guardian of the peace. As the commander's eyes and ears in a constantly shifting strategic environment, military intelligence is a combat multiplier which must be ready in peacetime to be effective in war. Precise, accurate and timely intelligence can add stability to an uncertain situation made increasingly unstable by the escalatory dangers of the modern battlefield and the apparent willingness of adversaries such as the Soviet Union to use force as a primary rather than a final means for achieving national objectives.

The KAL 747 incident has served to alert the world to the ever present danger posed by a Soviet military establishment larger than required for defensive purposes alone. The tragic loss of human life has revealed Moscow's apparent willingness to apply a military solution to even the most inappropriate situations. Such an incident raised the prospect that similarly inappropriate applications of force may occur in the future, possibly in circumstances of crisis and confrontation, where the deterrent value of well trained and ready military forces may prove crucial to containing and defusing a potentially lethal situation.

For U.S. Army military intelligence professionals, there is a need for a new commitment to readiness, excellence and precision. More than any time in our history, multidisciplinary intelligence at all levels of the conflict spectrum is required for the U.S. Army to keep the peace through strength, foresight and dedication to the democratic ideals for which it was raised and stands guard. ★

Footnotes

1. U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz said, "We can see no excuse whatsoever for this appalling act." "Trigger-Happy Soviets: A Jolt to Relations with the U.S." **U.S. News and World Report,** Sept. 12, 1983, p.23.
2. This includes what Barry R. Posen terms "inadvertent escalation," the unintended result of the conduct of a conventional war, particularly operations which threaten an adversary's nuclear forces. Barry R. Posen, "Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank." **International Security,** Vol. 7, No. 2, (Fall, 1982), pp. 28-54.
3. "Global Population: Growing by Leaps," **U.S. News and World Report,** Sept. 12, 1983, p. 70.
4. S.P. Huntington and J.M. Nelson, **No Easy Choice. Political Participation in Developing Countries,** (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), 224 pp.

Lt. Col. David T. Twining is currently an Army Fellow in the National Security Program at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. His education includes an M.P.A. from Syracuse University and an M.A. in Russian area studies from Georgetown University. Twining taught strategic studies at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and has served overseas in Berlin and Vietnam. Formerly the executive officer of the National Military Intelligence Center, Defense Intelligence Agency, his most recent assignment was as chief of the DIA Liaison Detachment at Canberra, Australia.

The STRATEGIC

By Lt. Col. Miles L. Kara

This is an article about quantum jumps. The single most dramatic quantum jump in strategic intelligence occurred in April 1984. For background, picture in your mind **2001: A Space Odyssey** as the music of Strauss propels the viewer from man's aboriginal beginning into outer space. Then recall that on April 9, 1984, in one dramatic motion, the U.S. casually plucked out of space an artificial satellite. Now, I don't know what effect that demonstrated capability had on U.S. strategic intelligence analysts, but it must have caused serious tremors in Soviet strategic analytical circles. A goal was demonstrated to be a realized capability. The follow-on capability to return such a catch to Earth has not been demonstrated, but the Soviets must assume that also to be a realized capability. Another quantum jump!

Let me take a moment to distinguish strategic intelligence. Intelligence is intelligence is intelligence. Despite the simplicity of that statement, the lexicon of intelligence includes the adjectives strategic, tactical, combat, current, basic, estimative, real-time, and so forth. In essence, regardless of form, intelligence seeks to answer a single question, "What is the threat?" Everything else is a matter of degree, time and space.

Strategic intelligence, therefore, is a time insensitive endeavor subject to dramatic change: a range increase for the Backfire bomber, for example, or the capability to fire a tank round

effectively on the move. Tactical intelligence, on the other hand, is time sensitive and subject to incremental change.

The major events in strategic intelligence are quantum increases or decreases in capability. These major events occur "overnight," but they can usually be tracked through development. A great deal of strategic intelligence is the art of piecing together all-source information to describe and predict quantum jumps in capability—a blue water Chinese naval capability, for example.

Some things represent a quantum change in threat; some do not. A Navy counterpart who delighted in calculating comparative nuclear throw weights, one day told me my desk top was worth a pound or two of throw weight and that my counterpart's desk in Moscow was worth somewhat less: a first time entry to comparative nuclear strength analysis. My only question was, "Is there assured lethality in both cases?" Given that the answer was yes, the point was moot, and there was no quantum threat change of strategic concern.

Threat is the driving force behind all aspects of a tactical intelligence analyst's work. This is equally true for the strategic intelligence analyst. Therefore, the knowledge requirements for both are easily listed.

First is an awareness of U.S. operational capabilities and plans. This may come as a surprise to some, but any analysis of the threat must be

linked to U.S. capabilities. Operators understand this approach and appreciate the intelligence officer who can communicate in clear, concise terms. A clear understanding of the threat picture posed to opposing forces by U.S. forces provides a basis for the second requirement—knowledge of the enemy.

It is given that the intelligence analyst knows enemy tactics and capabilities and, by inference, intentions. When integrated with knowledge of U.S. capabilities and plans, knowledge of the enemy provides the intelligence analyst with a basis for assessing the threat as proactive or reactive. This further assists the analyst in fulfilling the third requirement of assessing intentions.

A reactive threat is only as dangerous as the enemy's perception of the threat imposed by U.S. forces and plans. It can be analyzed in terms of demonstrated enemy capability and can be described through reference to U.S. operations. Soviet reaction to new roles and missions of the USS New Jersey is an example. A proactive threat, on the other hand, requires a recalculation of demonstrated capability in a new context. Soviet forward deployment in Vietnam is one example of a changing proactive threat.

A fourth requirement of analysts is best described as awareness of potential threats. In this instance, a spill-over problem must be accounted for. A good recent example was the Falklands War. Significant military

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forces repositioned into closer context to the U.S. and became a "de facto" change in the analytical threat equation. The spill-over problem in Southwest Asia from the Iran-Iraq War is another example of potential threat.

Strategic intelligence analysts must be at least conversant with, if not masters of, several disciplines. First is a familiarity with scientific method. Ultimately, the analyst should be able to take quantum leaps in imagination and insight based on statistical inference. This skill is rare. It is enough that the average analyst can use scientific methods. It is also enough that analytical cells have a few individuals who can perform quantum jumps in intuition and analysis.

This concept is akin to the elusive difference between the skilled amateur and the professional in any endeavor, be it sports, financial analysis or singing. Both the skilled amateur and the professional know all the rules of correct application of technique. The distinction is that the professional knows when to break all the rules, to dare to conceive of an unorthodox solution; in fact, to use the only approach that will succeed. One need only watch Martina Navratilova for a short while to grasp the distinction. No teaching pro would ever counsel a neophyte to emulate Navratilova. Hence it is that the ultimate essence of analysis cannot be taught but must be learned through experience.

A second discipline important to strategic analysts is economics. There is considerable interest in economic balance of power in peacetime. Threat is still involved, but it is measured in influence or inroad rather than military power projection. Japanese economic projection in PACOM, if not the world, is a matter of continuing strategic concern to intelligence analysts.

A further matter of strategic economic concern is analysis of technology transfer. The intricasies of this subject require a knowledge of the pragmatics of how businesses accomplish daily operations.

Strategic analysts must also be astute political observers. The key question in all cases is, "How is political power transferred?" The subtleties are as varied as the number of nations in the world. The typical analytical think piece is "Whither_____ after_____." The blanks are filled in this fashion: Iran after Khomeini, Philippines after Marcos, Zimbabwe after Mugabe, and so forth.

It should be clear by now that a strategic intelligence analyst must be a master of many disciplines, and the discussion could continue to include weatherman, geologist, navigator (dead reckoning is a continuing analytical problem), geographer, and technician in a diversity of trades (ship building, computers, harbormaster, you name it)!

Finally, the strategic analyst must be able to deal with the arcane, the "any subject under the sun," task. It falls to the duty analyst to provide the "first cut" on the extraordinary—a plane or ship where no plane or ship ought to be; the reported presence of Cubans here, there and everywhere; is Sakharov dead or alive; why are the decks of Soviet ships painted red; or, can you imagine, the likelihood of a falling Soviet satellite decaying in an erratic manner and hitting Honolulu.

Despite the best application of scientific method which proved that such a decaying satellite stood virtually no chance of hitting Honolulu, that conclusion was not readily accepted. The simple analytical truth is that the probability of a random falling object, including a satellite which survives re-entry, hitting a given geographic area is the same as the ratio of the target area to the total area of the Earth's surface.

The nonacceptance of an analytical finding is a fact of life with which the analyst must contend. Therefore, the final skill an analyst, especially a strategic analyst, must possess is an understanding of man the animal, his weaknesses, proclivities and demonstrated collective inability to learn from history. Should the reader still be ready and willing to "go strategic," take along a levy of humor, a dose of pragmatism, a dash of patience, a sense of anticipation and an awareness of quantum jumps. Out leaps your Soviet counterpart as he deals with the events of April 9, 1984.★

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Two years ago, Air Force Gen. David C. Jones, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, remarked, "We need great commanders with innovation and imagination, but we also need great strategists, and our present system doesn't develop them." He went on to say, "In our present system, Clausewitz would probably make full colonel, retire in 20 years and go to work for a think tank."[1]

Both military scholars and academics have long recognized the deficiencies in the formulation of American military strategy. Recent calls for reorganization of the JCS are all too familiar. But perhaps starting at the top is the wrong approach. Indeed, if the military personnel system provided greater incentive and possessed more flexibility at the lower levels, maybe those whose potential as

of national power to achieve an overt or covert political objective. Unfortunately, American military strategy is pursued independently of any sort of political strategy.

The Soviets avoid such confusion because of the close relationship between political and military strategy. Military strategy, operational art, and tactics form the three levels of military art, which is derived from military doctrine, which, in turn, is derived from political strategy. In **Marxism-Leninism on War and Army**, it is stated, "Without a political aim even the fiercest struggle will not be a war, but simply a fight."[3]

While the U.S. has produced great tacticians, such as Gen. George Patton, none has made any real imprint on strategic thought. Even Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, like others before

the U.S. lost in Vietnam abound, few would deny the effectiveness of the well-coordinated North Vietnamese strategy. Military moves were well-timed to complement their political efforts, which were aimed at the international community in general and the American public in particular. A similar coordination between U.S. political objectives and military efforts was totally nonexistent. Had the United States possessed a strategy, the outcome of the war may have been very different.

Before the emergence of the United States as the victor in World War II, Americans had few concerns of a global nature. Suddenly, though, the advent of nuclear weaponry, along with the new threat of strategic rivalry from the Soviet Union, forced many in the United States to take a hard

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strategists was the greatest might remain in the service and rise in the ranks because of their specialization, rather than their strict conformance to a career path of "ticket-punching."

In his book, **Makers of Modern Strategy**, Edward Mead Earle observes that the most significant American contributions to warfare have been in the fields of tactics and technology, rather than strategy.[2] Only two Americans are noted for strategic contributions: Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, who is perhaps the only American strategist to enjoy an international reputation; and Gen. William Mitchell, whose thinking on air strategy parallelled much of the work of Italian theorist Guilio Douhet.

The term strategy frequently means different things to different people. In American parlance, the word strategy is often used when the interlocutor really means operational art or tactics. Strategy involves the application

him, failed to integrate the political dimension into the conduct of war.

When Eisenhower ignored Churchill's warnings about the political aims of Stalin, in some ways he lowered the level of the struggle to that of a "fight," with military victory as the sole aim. Most often, American military experts have eschewed politics believing that their role was simply to fight and win wars. Though it is not the place of the military to participate in politics, it is their duty to understand politics.

The U.S. military victory did little to soften the blow of political defeat in World War II. The Soviet political gains which resulted from their military moves at the end of the war placed them in a position to dominate Eastern Europe and to keep Japan off-balance to this very day.

We also suffered in Vietnam because of the total absence of a coherent strategy. Though theories on why

look at global strategy. It was precisely at this time that the U.S. military relinquished any quest for predominance in the intellectual field of strategic thought to two new groups: civilian students of strategy, and national security policy makers.[4] Few other countries in the world have witnessed such a total lack of interest in a field so vital to the military profession. Even today, the pages of the most prestigious strategic journals of the French, British, German or Soviet societies are well represented, if not totally dominated, as in the case of the Soviets, by military writers. On the other hand, a glance at the pages of **Orbis**, **International Security**, **International Security Review**, or **Strategic Review** reveals a woeful lack of American military writers.

The establishment of think tanks in private concerns, such as the RAND Corporation, sealed the fate of the military as a meaningful actor in the

realm of strategic studies. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, eminent civilian strategists, such as Bernard Brodie, pioneered the formulation of nuclear strategy. During the same period, a group of Soviet officers, under Marshal Sokolovskiy, was busy constructing a blueprint on strategy, entitled **Military Strategy**, which would become an integral part of Soviet military policy over the following 20 years. Sokolovskiy's tome is still relevant today.

Whether U.S. strategy would have been any different had more military been actively involved is open to conjecture. The more significant question is, Where were they? Without being too simplistic, the U.S. military careerist was discouraged by the system. As one author put it, "Our armed forces do not reward 'thinkers,' they reward 'doers.' 'Doing' in the U.S. military, whether it be service in units or on high level staffs frequently involves 14 to 17 hours per day of work. For urely, ungraded sabbatical in an otherwise hectic career. Because the service academies are deficient in teaching the basics of military thought and strategic history and skills, it is not clear how an officer becomes a sound strategic thinker and staff officer except by picking up skills on his own."[7]

On the other hand, the Soviets go to great lengths to educate their officers in the art of war. War is truly studied within the field of military science which constitutes one of the major influences upon military doctrine and strategy; the other being, of course, political strategy, which is paramount. An officer's career is in no way blemished in the Soviet army if he spends several years at one of the institutes such as the Frunze Military Academy. The closest U.S. equivalent might be study at one of the war colleges or enrollment in the master's of military science program at the Army Command and General how to eliminate such problems. One solution involves the transfer of promotion authority for individuals serving on the Joint Staff from the individual service to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.[9] But despite such well-intentioned gestures, the problem persists. Parochialism has always triumphed over any true devotion to strategy. Even before reaching the exalted level of the Joint Staff, most officers who became interested in strategy and demonstrated any aptitude probably had already quit the service for employment in private firms, handsomely paid to "think" for DoD. Is it time to cultivate a generation of young officers who display promise as tomorrow's military strategists?

Both the German and French had dual paths for line and staff officers. At the turn of the century, young officers who were candidates of the feared and admired German general staff had to attend the war academy

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many, motivation, time for research, reflection and writing don't exist."[5]

Without belaboring the point, the U.S. Army is distinctively anti-intellectual. To be sure, it is quite easy to obtain a master's degree in the Army, in fact, it is widely encouraged. Nonetheless, most of this occurs to punch a ticket for entering the ranks as a field grade officer. The quality of the degree or of the effort put into it is relatively inconsequential. The study of war has never been taken seriously in the U.S. military. Even the U.S. Military Academy, the institution which produces the core of professional combat arms officers, experienced a period after the Vietnam War when the required course in military art was severely curtailed. Only recently has it been restored to its logical place in the curriculum.[6]

As for war colleges, one author notes: "All the war colleges, moreover, fail to push their students to maximum performance; for too many the year spent there is viewed as a leis- Staff College. Some Soviet officers spend 10 to 15 years studying and teaching at various academies and institutes. The sheer number of articles and books produced, the research facilities, and the three-year course length all help corroborate the seriousness of the Soviet approach.[8] Perhaps the United States should consider expanding programs such as the master's in military science and revamping the war colleges. It is unfortunate that our officers tend to avoid periods of study and reflection.

Duty on the Joint Staff is also rather unpopular because of the career implications. One of the problems with a military officer serving on the Joint Staff is that he has left his own service for a time and, thus, temporarily stepped out of competition with his peers. Furthermore, even for those so inclined, service on the Joint Staff is limited by law (10 U.S.C. 143) to three years, effectively destroying any continuity. Recent discussions on reforming the JCS have addressed for three years of competitive study before being qualified for general staff duty. During this period, a student would be detached for three months to a branch of service other than his own.[10] Once on the Prussian general staff, an officer remained there for good. To accede to the French general staff, a competitive course at the Ecole Superieure de Guerre had to be completed. The idea that staff duty on these exalted bodies of military strategists might be detrimental to a career would have seemed to be a rather curious notion by the ambitious French or German officer.

Does not the idea of the "quintessential" generalist officer in the U.S. Army fall far short of what is needed in the era of the AirLand Battle and its resulting complexity? Isn't it time to trade the present system, which produces a group of military clones bent on furthering their own career by punching identical sets of required tickets, for a more cohesive system—one which would direct people of dif-

ferent interests and abilities into different directions, integrating each individual into a whole and rewarding excellence in one or two areas rather than mediocrity in all areas?

A look at the structure of military intelligence in the U.S. Army can be revealing since a large number of officers accepted into this branch have studied political science, international relations, area studies or other fields related to strategic studies. Many even enter active duty with advanced degrees in some of these fields.

The career of a typical MI officer begins with the Officers Basic Course, followed by a specialization in one of three areas: Tactical Intelligence (35A)/Imagery Interpretation (35C), Counterintelligence (36A/B), or Electronic Warfare (37A/B). There does exist a strategic designator (35B), but this is awarded only after one has paid the dues and punched the proper tickets, not, on the contrary, by aptitude or inclination at the start. The earliest an MI officer can begin working in the strategic field is after serving an initial tactical tour of three years and then completing the advanced course. Unfortunately, this coincides with the end of most officers' three- or four-year obligation. With no guarantee of finally getting work at the strategic level, those who are not fortunate enough to gain one of the few slots to the Postgraduate Intelligence School, which often leads to DIA, either abandon the strategic field and resign themselves to a future of ticket punching, or else leave the service for the private sector. A recent statistic revealed that nearly 42 percent of 35A Tactical Intelligence Officers leave the Army between the fourth and sixth years of service.[11]

Certainly, few strategic aspirants would deny the value of understanding the tactical level and the requirements of the field commander. Yet, for the young, potential Army strategist, the path to success is uncertain

at best. Perhaps if a new lieutenant with a suitable academic background were assigned the 35B designator as a specialty from the start, but compelled to serve one or two years at the tactical level before being permanently rotated between strategic jobs for the remainder of a career, then the initial acquaintance with the tactical side of the house would be more meaningful and less discouraging.

A clear dichotomy between tactical and strategic intelligence assignments should exist. The present system only results in confusion and incompetence. Jumping back and forth between tactical and strategic jobs after having achieved the rank of captain only robs the intelligence field of any continuity, while preventing the development of needed specialists. Two or three years does not a strategist make.

The complex political-military environment of the 1980s demands specialists at all levels in the intelligence community. Changes in the very nature of many jobs in a more technical Army render the present emphasis on well-rounded generalist officers obsolete. This is not to deny that many areas of the Army still require the skills of the well-rounded generalist who has experienced many facets of a career field.

Intelligence, though, has always been a unique and somewhat bizarre craft, one which has been constantly misunderstood. Consequently, when the branch of military intelligence was created, no provisions for dealing with its peculiar nature were instituted; only conventional considerations were taken into account.

For instance, nowhere is it written that tactical intelligence must be the responsibility of the MI branch. Adequate precedent exists for combat arms officers to perform the duties of staff intelligence officers (S2s). But instead of looking to the more specialized areas of intelligence, the MI branch might soon return to the old

practice of detailing officers to combat arms of a period of time before they are strictly assigned as MI officers. The difference is that the detailed officer will have received schooling in the various intelligence specialties before serving in the combat arms. Previously, no Intelligence Officers Basic Course existed. Just how the system will actually work and whether an officer will attend two basic courses remain to be seen.

There is also a new plan which will have all entry level MI lieutenants assigned the tactical 35A specialty. This move is designed to give all MI lieutenants a sound tactical orientation. However, it still fails to address the problem of strategic intelligence and the 35B designator. Under the new system, lieutenants will all start out as tactical intelligence officers receiving no specialized training. After a tactical tour and the Advanced Course, the lieutenant will then be able to choose a specialty, for example, counterintelligence or electronic warfare. There still appears to be no way to enter the strategic field relatively early in an officer's career. While attendance at the Postgraduate Intelligence School provides the base for a strategic assignment, the selection process is not geared toward cultivating a specialist who will remain in the field. Unlike training in the 36 and 37 fields, 35B does not rank as a specialty; rather, under the present system, it is no more than a job designator. This must change if there is to be any depth or substance to the strategic field within the Army.

However, a more radical solution may be needed. Why not separate tactical intelligence from the MI branch altogether, leaving only the highly specialized areas of counterintelligence, electronic warfare, imagery interpretation, and strategic intelligence?

Combat arms officers, who could be provided with a few weeks of training on Soviet tactics and doctrine,

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would make far better tactical intelligence officers than the inexperienced second lieutenants who presently occupy most S2 positions—and they would also command more respect among their combat arms commanders. Perhaps this might enhance the status of intelligence at the tactical level. Presently, intelligence at that level is neither appreciated nor widely sought by tactical commanders.

As the AirLand Battle doctrine unfolds, it is becoming apparent that all-source intelligence will be vital to the commander. Certainly, the commander who is deprived of desperately needed battlefield intelligence will be at a great disadvantage. There will be a greater need than ever for people at each level who understand what is significant, can discern such material from huge quantities of data, and can produce all-source intelligence in a timely fashion.

If separating tactical intelligence from the MI branch is too radical,

assigned as an assistant tactical intelligence officer for a year or two. Here the strategic officer could learn a great deal without the uncertainty about his or her future in the Army. The ensuing years could be spent studying war on the grand scale.

If such a change in policy were to occur, the MI educational structure would only need slight modification. A 35B strategic course would have to be created. One possibility would be to expand the Postgraduate Intelligence School to accommodate a small increase in present numbers. It should be remembered that there are not that many strategic jobs, so the specialty would be limited and fairly competitive. This again is no radical departure from current Army practices in MI or in other specialized fields such as the foreign area officer program.

Through the development of a true strategic specialty, a serious field of military science might finally start to evolve. At last, a specific group would

path were encouraged, and if those who entered it were rewarded, then the number of tactical intelligence officers available at any given time might even increase. On the strategic side, those disgruntled officers who comprise part of the 42 percent of 35As who presently leave the service might suddenly discover a new and rewarding alternative to employment in the private sector. Many young men or women who feel called to national service might not be frustrated into giving up such a career.

Within the MI branch today there are many disillusioned and frustrated officers who thought that analytical jobs were within reach and who had worked hard to acquire that type of background needed to fill such jobs. Faced with the certainty that the Army will do its best to shape them all into mediocre generalists, many will leave the service for more challenging jobs in the private sector.

Specialization in intelligence should

Why not separate tactical intelligence from the MI branch altogether?

maybe a special section of MI should deal solely with the tactical intelligence specialty, whose officers would remain in the field throughout a career, alternating between command jobs and tactical intelligence assignments. Such an officer would more than likely come from the pool of combat arms officers who possess an interest in intelligence and generally get into the field by attaining a secondary specialty in 35A because a primary specialty would have negative effects on their career progression. Since this officer already exists, why not just transfer the tactical intelligence area to the combat arms? Then S2s would turn out to be combat arms captains who had gained experience and who could afford, in terms of career progression, to complete a tour in their secondary specialty.

The strategic aspirant could also benefit from such a system. Once schooled in a new 35B strategic specialty, this officer might then be

be dedicated to the study of war and would progress in the strategic career field because of the ability to think. With time, these men and women might finally exert some influence in the strategic field as a whole. At some point younger officers might also be encouraged to attend war colleges which should be restructured so that a much more serious contribution to strategic thinking could be made by the military. Other institutions should exist for the study of operational art, tactics, the link between military strategy and tactics, and perhaps an expanded Command and General Staff College.

Would the tactical area of intelligence suffer as a result of these changes? If a clear dichotomy were established between the tactical and strategic sides of intelligence, an overall improvement in both areas should result. On the tactical side, many combat arms officers already choose a career path which includes MI as a secondary specialty. If this

be taken no less seriously than that in engineering or in the medical field. Seldom would a doctor be found in the position of hospital administrator. On the contrary, his or her specialization can be put to better use. Good analysts, like good doctors, are not produced overnight. To claim that someone who has "punched many tickets" and has proven to be a good field commander is suddenly ready to assume the job of the strategic analyst is not only shortsighted but also very dangerous. Developing a field dedicated to analysis and strategy is highly desirable in the complex world of the 1980s and beyond. There will be no time for on-the-job training in the future. Random displacement of people from one field to another must end. The opportunity to specialize might bring potential Army strategists out of the woodwork and into a meaningful career; the present system seems to bring them out of the Army and into the private sector where rank, when separated from ability, means very little indeed. ★

Footnotes:

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3. **Marxism-Leninism on War and Army**, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972, p. 19.
4. Russell F. Weigley, **The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy**, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973, p. 405.
5. William Taylor, " 'Clearance' Muzzles Military Strategists," **Washington Star**, July 14, 1981, p. 9.
6. Jay Luvaas, "Military History Is It Still Practicable?" **Parameters**, March 1982, p. 3.
7. John Kester, "Designing a U.S. Defense General Staff." **Strategic Review**, Summer 1981, p. 44.
8. Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, **The Armed Forces of the USSR**, Boulder: West View Press, 1979, p. 357.

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9. Gen. David Jones, "Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change," **Armed Forces Journal International**, March, 1982, p. 72.
10. Lee von Geyr, "The German General Staff," **Military Review**, November 1962, p. 24.
11. Russell Grimm, "The 35A Dilemma," **Military Intelligence**, July-September 1981, p. 16.

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IPAC Receives
Joint Meritorious Award

The Intelligence Center Pacific recently became the first military command to receive the Joint Meritorious Unit Award. The presentation was made on June 30, 1983, by Gen. John Vessey, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Capt. Richard R. McDonald, USN, Commanding Officer.

The Joint Meritorious Unit Award was established in 1981 to recognize joint activities of the U.S. Armed Forces that, since January 23, 1979, have distinguished themselves by exceptionally meritorious service in pursuit of joint military missions of great significance.

The award covered the period from September 1, 1980 through March 31, 1983. The IPAC was cited for its exceptional service and intelligence support to the Commander in Chief Pacific and PACOM operational commanders during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the crisis in Iran and other significant developments in the PACOM region.

The IPAC is a joint military command under the Commander In Chief Pacific, located at Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii, overlooking Pearl Harbor. Since its establishment in 1974, IPAC's mission has been to provide intelligence support to PACOM operational commanders and to the Commander in Chief Pacific. IPAC is organized into three line directorates. One of these provides indications and warning, performs current area analysis, maintains order of battle and prepares threat studies for use by CINCPAC, his staff, other theater commands, and national authorities. A second directorate has responsibility for tailored production in such functional intelligence disciplines as electronic intelligence, logistic analysis, installation data maintenance and target intelligence. The third directorate provides all levels of intelligence data processing support required for IPAC mission accomplishment.

There are approximately 370 personnel assigned to the IPAC, including about 75 civilians. The Army provides 40 officers and 39 enlisted personnel. Most Army officers are assigned in the current intelligence and threat analysis division. Both strategic intelligence analysts (35B) and foreign area officers (42) are utilized. In addition, the IPAC uses ground order of battle analysts (96B), imagery interpreters (96D), target analysts (96B), graphics technicians (84 series), and computer operations (74 series). The IPAC is a unique joint service environment where Army intelligence personnel can pursue their careers and further develop their skills while providing critical support towards the accomplishment of national goals and objectives.

INDICATIONS
WARNINGS
Bureaucracies

by Stephen J. Andriole

The higher the stakes, the higher the competition among intelligence organizations.

Between 1940 and 1969 no less than 30 separate intelligence offices and agencies were created by the U.S. government.[1] Since 1969, some of these organizations have disappeared, some have merged, and some new ones have been added to the list, which today contains over 40 separate organizations. The point here is not to assess the usefulness of each intelligence organization but rather to characterize intelligence as a growth industry. In addition to the myriad of collection and analysis organizations, there exists a hierarchically organized warning community comprised of the White House Situation Room, the National Military Intelligence Alert Center, the Central Intelligence Agency's Operations Center, the State Department's Intelligence and Research Watch Center, the National Signal Intelligence Operations Center, and various theater centers, among others. But, in operation, the "system" is not at all hierarchical. Intelligence organizations and warning centers frequently compete with one another and sometimes even engage in bureaucratic sabotage.[2] Based upon a detailed analysis of the U.S. strategic and tactical warning capabilities as affected

and influenced by various authorized and unauthorized bureaucratic procedures, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence reported that: "Major changes in the organization of the 'warning community,' changes in communications and warning procedures, and widespread adoption of automated data processing have been spurred by past crises. Due to the absence of a focal point for community-wide warning policy in recent years, efforts to test the utility of new warning procedures, reporting formats, and crisis management procedures have been inconclusive."[3]

Given the problems that we have recently had forecasting international and intranational crises, we must constantly test and improve the way we derive accurate warnings from indications. Unfortunately, too many obstacles to accurate warning can be traced not to the inherent unpredictability of the international and intranational environment, but directly to the size and structure of our intelligence bureaucracy.

This article looks at how the intelligence community bureaucracy affects the way we monitor and forecast events and conditions important to our national interest. It also tries to

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develop ideas that might reduce some of the problems connected with the indications and warnings process. While it should be stressed that this article focuses on the problems traceable to bureaucratization, it by no means seeks to condemn the entire bureaucratic process. In fact, it can be argued that the absence of an intelligence community bureaucracy would threaten indications and warnings performance much more than the ills which it creates. Yet there remain some serious problems, not the least of which include redundancy, inflexible prioritization, convoluted incentives, and bizarre consumption patterns.

PERENNIAL REDUNDANCY

How many intelligence organizations worry about the likelihood of political instability in sub-Saharan Africa? How many assess Soviet military strength? How many monitor the international flow of high technology? Not only do many separate intelligence organizations analyze the same phenomena in-house, but they frequently purchase the same outside services as well.[4]

In a recent interview, Admiral Bobby Inman, former Deputy of the Central Intelligence Agency, stated that while competitive analysis can be constructive, " . . . We have to guard against competition or duplication in collection. In analysis, since bits and pieces and assumptions are very important, competitive analysis provides differing perspectives . . . but truly good competitive analysis has as a corollary good communications among the various analysis and between the analysts and the collector . . . "[5]

Do analysts communicate across agencies? Research suggests that very little communication exists during noncrisis periods and virtually none occurs during crisis situations.[6] In fact, the higher the stakes, the higher the competition among intelligence organizations is likely to be.

Redundancy also dilutes effectiveness in other ways. Many of our most capable analysts frequently work on the same problems. This net loss of human capital is incalculable. How many of the 40 percent or so unanticipated crises since 1945 might have been forecast if all available analytical talent was focused and coordinated?[7] Redundancy also contributes

to ambiguity. On those occasions when requests are made to several competing intelligence organizations, uncoordinated analysis and estimates can confuse the decision-making process.

Finally, redundancy contributes to complacency in subtle ways. Intelligence failure post mortems suggest that there is often a sense of diffuse responsibility that results in perceptions that "someone must be looking at it," perceptions that permit important analytical problems to fall through the cracks.[8]

COUNTERPRODUCTIVE PRIORITIES

Bureaucracies are characterized by sets of fixed rules which govern the behavior of official participants who engage in more or less regular activities. Authority is always "arranged" hierarchically. In principle, bureaucratic rules are supposed to ease procedural problems, but unfortunately, somewhere along the line bureaucratic organizations evolved into living functioning entities capable of thwarting even the best intentions. One of the classic expressions of bureaucratic influence has to do with the roles played within a bureaucracy. Sociologists have long argued that bureaucracies have so developed that one's individual identity is completely dependent upon one's bureaucratic or organizational role. The sad implication here is that individuals within organizations and bureaucracies infrequently respond to other individuals, but rather almost always deal with the roles created within the bureaucratic structure. Consequently, it is often extremely difficult to operate as an individual within a large bureaucracy. One is almost always constrained by the policies, procedures, rules, and regulations which, in essence, comprise the bureaucracy.

But where do these policies, procedures, and rules come from? Generally, they emerge from an excruciatingly slow iterative process which almost always involves far more participants than necessary. What often emerges then is consensus that represents the best and worst of merged fact and opinion. Bureaucratic priorities are gleaned from this consensus; and the behavior of those within the organization are, in turn, determined

Historically, budgets for analytical methodology have been incredibly small relative to collection and nonstructured analytical efforts.

While the intelligence community has spent huge sums to enhance intelligence collection and routing, it has spent precious little to upgrade its analytical capabilities.

by bureaucratic priorities—priorities which, after all the discussions, meetings, and memoranda, may not be in the interest of the organization or the larger entity they are intended to serve.

When we turn to the intelligence community bureaucracy we can see a number of priorities, born from several ongoing traditions, that are not completely consistent with improved analysis. The first has to do with the relationship between collection and analysis. At some point in the evolution of the intelligence bureaucracy, judgments were made regarding the value of information. The net result was the presumption that the sheer quantity of incoming intelligence would somehow guarantee the quality of the finished product. In reality, no such relationship exists. (In fact, a strong case can be made that the two are inversely related.) Yet efforts to increase the amount of incoming intelligence continue unquestioned while attempts to improve the screening and analysis process go relatively unsupported. The fact of the matter is that intelligence analysts have far too much information to analyze and few guidelines regarding how to separate chatter from meaningful signals of impending crises and conflicts. Moreover, most of the incoming information and analyses are capabilities-oriented making it virtually impossible to isolate meaningful signals of adversary intentions.

The consequences of information overload are easily understood. Analysts who are expected to process more data than they want, need, or can possibly absorb generally develop procedures for routing and/or otherwise deflecting information while simultaneously extracting that which suits their purposes. Others who attempt to stay atop the endless flow of information often burn themselves out, like air traffic controllers, after only a few years on the job.

Yet the trend continues. Working groups and committees within the bureaucracy still stress the need for more information. Efforts to "modernize" various collection and analysis centers, such as the National Military Intelligence Center, continue to be organized and assessed around the number of computer terminals that can be crammed into a fixed space.

The bureaucratic priorities con-

nected with the use of military-versus-indications and hardware-versus-analysis can be explained by the larger bureaucratic interest which is predominantly military in character. There is also an engineering orientation to the organization and operation of the intelligence community which all but choked attempts to augment the analytical procedures by which analyses and estimates are produced with modern methodologies.[9]

This problem of analytical methodology is especially important and illustrative of how bureaucratic priorities can smother ideas that run against the bureaucractic grain. In several Intelligence Research and Development Council reports from its Working Group on Analytical Methodology, the intelligence community has been indicted for methodological obsolescence and in spite of several efforts to upgrade analytical capabilities, most analyses still go uninformed by systematic qualitative and quantitative applied methodologies.[10]

The absence of structured analytical methodology in the analytical process is both unnecessary and dangerous. It is unnecessary because the methodology has been tested and is readily available. It is dangerous because it renders a critical process static. So that there is no misunderstanding about the nature and power of quantitative analytical methodology, it is not proposed here as an analytical cure-all; rather, it is suggested that methods and techniques like quantitative indicator development, decision analysis, time-series forecasting, correlation, regression, operations research, and multiattribute utility-based evaluation, among others, can add new analytical dimensions to the essentially judgmental procedures which dominate today's estimate processes. Note the conclusion of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: "Analytical pitfalls have been recognized in post mortems and other studies of past warning situations, and limited organizational and training efforts have been undertaken in response. Existing mechanisms do not ensure that analysts ask all pertinent questions or that they confront reasonable alternative hypotheses; the use of structured and analytical methodologies is

still in its infancy, and improving analysis through better personnel management receives little concentrated attention."[11]

In short, while the intelligence community has spent huge sums to enhance intelligence collection and routing, it has spent precious little to upgrade its analytical capabilities. Some of those meager funds were spent on the development of an Analytical Support Center housed at Mathtech, Inc., and jointly sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Intelligence Community Staff, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.[12] The objective of the center was to provide analytical capabilities to members of the intelligence community on a kind of "on-call" basis. But after more than five years the number of calls slowed to a trickle and the Analytical Support Center concept was soon pronounced dead not because the concept was inherently bad but because the intelligence community bureaucracy resisted the changes which the center— by its very existence—represented.

CONVOLUTED INCENTIVES

It is widely known, though not publicized nearly enough, that bureaucratic incentive systems frequently undermine progress. In the federal bureaucracy, for example, one is promoted on the basis of how much money and how many people are managed, not according to how much money or effort is saved. Relatedly, promotions accrue to those who stay the course, not those who attempt to implement threatening changes, while the least likely to succeed are those who complain publicly about bureaucratic incompetence and waste.

Ambiguous warnings often result from peculiar incentives in the intelligence bureaucracy, warnings that are frequently rejected by decision makers unwilling to act upon less than perfect information. In response, inexperienced analysts sometimes produce less ambiguous, more daring estimates. But the vast majority become even more conservative, adapting to the bureaucratic inertia which rewards complacency and punishes aggressiveness. Like nearly all successful bureaucrats, intelligence analysts adjust to the environment in which they operate. Many will admit that in order to advance within their organizations they must always err on the side of conservatism and avoid at all cost the ambiguous outlying warning.

In this caustic "DIA Intelligence to Please," Patrick J. McGarvey suggests that incentives and behavior are understandable in terms of the shortness of intelligence tours of duty.[13] According to McGarvey, intelligence officers in the military only have incentives to perform well during their short tours of duty. Long-term problems are thus ignored in favor of current brush fires. The rotation process also places individuals with little or no warning experience in key analytical and managerial positions. On the other end of this bizarre continuum is the promotion of good analysts into managerial positions where their analytical talents are lost forever in endless memoranda and meetings. Indeed, it is a peculiar trait of American corporate and governmental organizational behavior that lavishes much more prestige on managers than substantive analysts or technicians and in the process renders itself much less efficient. Unfortunately, our intelligence bureaucracy frequently suffers from the same self-inflicted malaise. Because of the increased prestige and salary, bureaucrats aspire to leave analytical positions for managerial ones, positions for which they may or may not be qualified.

The promotion system in the intelligence community (and indeed in the larger military establishment and federal bureaucracy) also creates an incentive to inculcate what is perceived to be organizational "policy." While the intelligence community, of course, does not have any international or intranational policies of its own, it is quite capable of understanding the policy preferences of its primary consumers. Members of the community, in turn, absorb these preferences and analyze, estimate, and report at least to some extent with these preferences in mind. As Blachman has pointed out, "At least since Cleopatra, messengers have been punished for bringing news that upset the commander's preconceptions."[14] The effect of anger-avoidance behavior cannot really be calculated, but certainly should be regarded as counterproductive. Chan is even more specific about how bureaucratic preferences infiltrate the indications

Depending upon the operational attitude of the consumer community, intelligence producers may come to distrust consumers and treat them as adversaries.

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and warnings process: " . . . differences in analytical considerations tend to be restricted to issues of technical sufficiency and cost-benefit ratios. Like other bureaucrats, intelligence analysts have to conform to the regime's basic views . . . "[15]

IMPERFECT CONSUMERS, TOO

There is a tendency to associate bureaucracy with the production of intelligence, but in practice, there are just as many bureaucratic problems on the consumer side. On those occasions when relatively unbureaucratized intelligence is delivered to the policy-making community, it may be manipulated by consumers in ways that resemble the highly bureaucratic production process. Elmo Zumwalt Jr. has suggested that certain "unpleasant" analyses and estimates may be filtered away from the president and his senior advisors by those unwilling to carry bad news or news that contradicts an administration's preferred policy.[16] Chan is even more pessimistic: " . . . even assuming that decision makers are presented with meaningful . . . intelligence . . . . there is no reason to expect that they will choose wisely. Their choice tends to reflect personal experience and operational responsibility, considerations of institutional loyalty and source credibility . . . nor should we assume that they have the necessary qualifications to exercise the judgments needed, since they tend to be generalists rather than specialists in their training."[17]

Finally, consumers sometimes make contradictory requests of the intelligence community, ignore the results of carefully conducted analyses, and play off intelligence organizations against one another for political purposes. Consequently, depending upon the operational attitude of the consumer community, intelligence producers may come to distrust consumers and treat them as adversaries.

SOME WAYS OUT

It is interesting that many American corporate bureaucracies are turning toward unconventional approaches to help with management and productivity problems. Even more interesting is the nature of this help and advice: nearly all of it is targeted at the individuals who comprise the bureaucracies. Of central concern are

employee participation in policy making and organization, the systematic use of positive and negative incentives, and the pluralization of the work process by informing the individual about the larger bureaucratic mission and his or her specific role within the mission. Suggested here is that the very same emphasis be used to reorganize the intelligence production and consumption process. Please note that this does not constitute a proposal to make certain that intelligence agency A report to agency B, and so forth. Executive Orders 11905, 12036, and 12333 already deal with such matters very well. Rather, the suggestion here is to apply some basic "human factors" principles to the intelligence process.

The human factors approach to intelligence community reorganization would stress analysis over collection, the use of structured over unstructured analytical methodologies, the development of objective situational standards, and the development and application of positive and negative incentives consistent with all of the above.

But the call here is not for any radical redistribution of bureaucratic wealth. In the case of analysis versus collection, for example, no one would seriously suggest that we be able to thoroughly analyze everything we collect. Rather, the suggestion here is to balance collection efforts with realistic assessments about analytical capabilities and to identify collection targets accordingly. This approach would reduce the overall collection and analytical burden and, thereby, give the system the flexibility it needs to deal with severe intranational and international crises as soon as they erupt. As with the design and development of "user-friendly" computer systems, the analysts (users) themselves should be enlisted to help with the analysis versus collection assessments and participate actively in the identification of collection targets most likely to yield the most diagnostic intelligence.

Ideas regarding the use of structured versus unstructured analytical methodologies are even more straightforward. Over the past several years a number of offices and agencies—like the CIA's Office of Research and Development, the Office of Naval Research, and the Defense Intel-

ligence Agency—have tried to introduce new methods into the intelligence community, but more often than not have found themselves rather like the proverbial albatross in a bureaucratic sea filled with other priorities. Historically, budgets for analytical methodology have been incredibly small relative to collection and nonstructured analytical efforts. Consequently, progress has been slow—but not at all unimpressive. There are also ways to determine "once and for all" if the new methods are really useful. One way might involve some controlled A/B team experiments where one group would use all new methods while the other used conventional ones. If the warning problem was chosen carefully enough and the experiment was properly conducted then we would gain some valuable insight into strengths and weaknesses of the two general analytical approaches. After several experiments we would be able to develop a matrix of methods and problems which would recommend when to use—and not to use—a particular method. Not unlike a lot of "human factors" ideas, the experiments would be easy to arrange, fast, cheap and likely to yield enormous payoffs; and as the old argument goes, even if the payoffs were not enormous the experiments would probably still be very cost-effective.

Remedies to the problems traceable to any large bureaucracy are much more difficult to come by, particularly since one must be careful to preserve the useful as one tries to excise the unnecessary and wasteful. As all "reformers" have eventually discovered, the middle ground is very hard to define. While few would describe the intelligence community bureaucracy as perfect, even fewer would want to dismantle it. Part of the problem lies in the sheer size of the intelligence bureaucracy, while other parts of the problem are traceable to the nature of our pluralistic democratic system where points of view are used simultaneously to make and destroy policy. Since it nets out positive, grand designs to rearrange the intelligence community bureaucracy are probably best left to the architects of utopia.

At the same time, like the studies and experiments suggested above, there are ways to incrementally improve the bureaucratic process. It has already been demonstrated, for example, that enormous leverage can be gained via the systematic use of positive and negative bureaucratic incentives.[19] One cannot help but conclude that if significant, negative, bureaucratic consequences were attached to the use of outdated threat models and inappropriate methodologies they would not be used and, conversely, if promotions and other rewards were directly linked to preferred behavior then such behavior would occur. Research which attempts to identify and "manage" behavior for bureaucratic incentives would be well worth pursuing.

All these ideas represent some quick, somewhat "dirty," and cheap fixes to a set of problems that continue to undermine the efficiency of our warning apparatus. Grandiose solutions were deliberately avoided here primarily because they are very hard to develop and because such solutions tend to rest upon unnecessarily harsh indictments of the entire intelligence community. Attempts at wholesale bureaucratic reorganization never really work and often end up undermining the process they were designed to improve. Small but accurately targeted solutions are usually much more durable. Hopefully, a few have been identified here.   ★

Footnotes

1. See, among others, Thomas G. Belden's, "Indications, Warnings, and Crisis Operations," **International Studies Quarterly**, Volume 21, Number 1, March 1977, pages 181-198.
2. See Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter, eds., **Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective** (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973) for some examples of sabotage. Also see Steve Chan's "The Intelligence of Stupidity: Understanding Failures in Strategic Warning," **American Political Science Review**, Volume 73, 1979, pages 171-180, and Albert Clarkson, **Toward Effective Strategic Analysis: New Applications of Information Technology** (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981).
3. **Warning: An Assessment of Intelligence Community Performance and Capability**, staff report by the Subcommittee on Evaluation, U.S. House of Representatives, August 1978.
4. This behavior remains an excellent example of bureaucratic uncoordination. It is not at all unusual, for example, to see

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> Attempts at wholesale bureaucratic reorganization never really work and often end up undermining the process they were designed to improve.

contract awards in the **Commerce Business Daily** for research in the same areas, and for the same problems—and solutions—to appear and reappear almost in cyclic fashion as new managers arrive and old ones depart. The substantive area of counterterrorism is a good case in point. It is difficult to identify all government offices and agencies which have collected information about terrorist groups and incidents; it is also the case that these offices and agencies have barely communicated with each other, save through "working groups," "task forces" and "commissions" which somehow have a way of drifting away from their reason for being. The author's experience with the management of a project to assemble a terrorism data base was frustrating because agencies and offices were unwilling to share what they had already accomplished.

5. Bobby Ray Inman, as quoted in a National Military Intelligence Association interview in **The American Intelligence Journal,** Volume 4, Number 4, September 1982, pages 6-12.

6. See Belden, "Indications, Warnings and Crisis Operations," Chan, "Intelligence of Stupidity," Halperin and Kanter, **Readings in American Foreign Policy,** the Feb. 16, 1976 supplement to the **Village Voice** where the "Pike Papers" on intelligence failures appeared, and Richard W. Shryock, "The Intelligence Community Post-Mortem Program, 1973-1975," **Intelligence Studies,** XX1/2, Summer, pages 15-28.

7. Research by Leo Hazelwood, John J. Hayes and James R. Brownell suggests that from 1946 to 1953 nearly 50 percent of the international crises were unanticipated by the U.S. intelligence community; from 1954 to 1965 31 percent were unanticipated; and from 1966 to 1975 over 35 percent were unanticipated. See their "Planning for Problems in Crisis Management," **International Studies Quarterly,** Volume 21, Number 1, March 1977, pages 75-106.

8. See the "Pike Papers" and Chan, "Intelligence of Stupidity."

9. The "engineering orientation" to intelligence research and development has resulted in more hardware, more collection targets, fewer analysts and an avoidance of social, behavioral and managerial research methodologies.

10. One notable report was to then Undersecretary for Defense Research and Engineering William Perry in 1979 which had no calculable impact.

11. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, **Warning: An Assessment.**

12. The funding was shared until 1977 when the CIA continued the ₵enter. In 1980, the analytical activities ceased.

13. Patrick J. McGarvey, "DIA: Intelligence to Please," in Halperin and Kanter, eds., **Readings in American Foreign Policy,** pages 318-327.

14. Morris J. Blachman, "The Stupidity of Intelligence," in Halperin and Kanter, eds., **Readings in American Foreign Policy,** pages 328-333.

15. Chan, "Intelligence of Stupidity."

16. See Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr. discussant on Richard H. Giza's, "The Problems of the Intelligence Consumer," in Roy Godson, ed., **Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Analysis and Estimates,** (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books/National Strategy Information Center, 1980), pages 211-214.

17. Chan, "Intelligence of Stupidity." Also see Chan's "Warning Forecasts: Evaluations, Heueristics, and Policy Context," in Gerald W. Hopple, Stephen J. Andriole, and Amos Freedy, eds., **National Security Crisis Forecasting and Management** (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983).

18. See John J. Hayes, et. al., **Incentive Management: Stimulating Worker Productivity through Rewards-for-Performance,** Arlington, Va.: CACI, Inc., April 1979, and E. Lawler, **Motivation in Work Organizations,** Monterey, Calif.: Brooks Cole Publishing Company, 1973.

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This wordsearch puzzle contains the names of 30 famous military leaders. The list of names has been encrypted in a simple substitution system. You may try to recover the names from the puzzle directly or by solving the encrypted names in the list first. Once you have found all the names and marked them off (a highlighter is recommended) the remaining letters will spell out a quotation by the ancient chinese philosopher, Loo-Tzu.

O G L N F
Z D P Z I C J V Z N
O G L R P Z V D Q Y
L G Z W L I T Z N
U L N N L B R Q

B D L K
V Z G G D I B Q J I
M L O L N Q C R N
T J J G D Q Q G Z
K Z N P C D I B

```
          W                    
        R   E   H              
        Y E   W E              
        E W   S O T            
        S O   N L H A T        
        N L H   J A N E H      
        J A N   A H E R R      
        A H E   A C E S G B I  
        A C E S G B I          
  T U G A R R A F L E K R I E R E D N A X E L A S D
  T P E R S H I N G S C E H M A C A R T H U R A
  L N E A T D D O O L I T T L E E N R L S Y
  N O T T A P W N A H K S I H G N E G A
  A E O R K Y I U S C D U N O M I N
  L N E E T S A I H U C M A
  O E L P E E R T O O P
  P D S W P E L R T
  E A S I S D W A O
  S R R N T Y E W E M D
  E I B O Z L R K D A N
  N I A H L   F T R M O
O O M U I       G U A S R
S J K N         R Y L E
L O G           A E C
V V T           N E S
X O             T Y
N                 Z
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
B N L I Q
I L K J G Z J I
E L O F P J I
L Q Q D G L
O R P Q Z N
Y C R F J S
N J H H Z G
G Z Z
T L X L I
P C Z N D T L I

E J I Z P
X L H L H J Q J
A N L T G Z X
K L Q Q J I
C L G P Z X
I Z G P J I
O L Z P L N
U N Z T Z N D O F Q C Z B N Z L Q
B Z I B C D P F C L I
H L J Q P Z Q R I B

The Defense Intelligence College Comes of Age

by Dr. Hugo Keesing

Service members who have never heard of the Defense Intelligence College may be suprised to learn that there is a fully accredited educational institution devoted to teaching strategic intelligence. Besides a one-year master of science degree in Strategic Intelligence, the college also offers a variety of credit and noncredit courses at the graduate and undergraduate levels.

For the better part of two decades, the Defense Intelligence College, a joint educational institution operated and controlled by the Defense Intelligence Agency under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was one of the military's best kept secrets. Established in 1962 through the merger of the Naval Intelligence School's postgraduate intelligence curriculum with the Army's Strategic Intelligence School, the then Defense Intelligence School found a home in some World War II temporary buildings in the Anacostia section of Washington, D.C. There it proceeded to carry out its mission to " . . . conduct courses of instruction related to Department of Defense intelligence functions designed to:
• Enhance the preparation of selected military officers and key DoD civilian personnel for important command, staff, and policy-making positions in the national and international security structure.
• Prepare DoD military and civilian personnel for duty in the military attache system.
• Assist the broad career development of DoD military and civilian personnel assigned to intelligence functions."

During its first year, the school conducted five academic programs for 972 students. Programs emphasized both training and the acquisition of broad cognitive skills for intelligence professionals. Over the next six years the number of programs increased to nine and resident enrollment averaged just over 960 students per year.

One of the key offerings of the school was the Defense Intelligence Course. The charter specified that this be a graduate level course appropriate to professionals at midpoint in their careers. In 1966, following a thorough review by the American Council on Education, it was recommended for up to ten hours of graduate transfer credit. That same year both the Defense Intelligence Course and the Intelligence Analyst Course became career courses under the Intelligence Career Development Program.

During the 1970s, user requests prompted the addition of a number of new courses which broadened both the training and educational missions of the school. Among the new courses added in 1973 was a pilot for a master's degree. Permission to begin such a program had to come from both DoD and the Office of Management and Budget. Once the pilot program got underway, it was subject to evaluation by the U.S. Office of Education to see if it met the criteria for a federal degree-granting institution. Those criteria included program quality and uniqueness, as well as essentiality in accomplishing the school's mission. First in 1974, and again in 1979, a visiting team of distinguished educators determined that the Defense Intelligence School met all the requirements for degree-granting status. Following the second visit, legislation was introduced in Congress to authorize a master's degree.

The late 1970s saw the addition of two programs which helped reshape the school's image. One was the Combined Strategic Intelligence Training Program, which admitted foreign intelligence officers. The presence of highly qualified and carefully selected allied officers added an international dimension to the instructional mission. A second program, also designed to meet new and growing

needs, was the Intelligence Continuing Education Program.

During its first several years, the DIS had offered a correspondence course for students unable to attend one of the resident programs. It was discontinued in 1970. Recognizing that the needs of part-time students not only continued to exist but were growing, the school began a program that would permit intelligence professionals in the Capitol area to take one or more courses during duty hours. From the outset, all continuing education courses have been at the graduate level.

As the range of programs and courses grew, so did the constituency for the Defense Intelligence School instruction. Besides representing the four military services, students came to the school from the Defense Intelligence Agency, CIA, National Security Agency, Coast Guard, FBI, Library of Congress, various united and specified commands, and other government agencies. A broader range of students also translated into more students—almost 1400 in 1979.

In 1980, the 96th Congress passed legislation authorizing the school to award the degree of master of science in Strategic Intelligence. The MSSI degree is unique in the United States and represents the educational capstone for intelligence professionals. Since 1981, when it was first conferred, more than 70 students have successfully completed all requirements for the degree.

Degree-granting status also enabled the school to pursue regional accreditation for all of its programs. The first milestone was achieved in June 1981, when DIS was accepted as a candidate for accreditation by the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools. Over the next 18 months faculty, staff and students were involved in an intensive and comprehensive self-study effort that ulti-

mately resulted in a number of significant changes.

Changes reached every area of the school. For example, exisiting courses were carefully reviewed for potential transfer credit. This proved to be especially important for the Senior Enlisted Intelligence Program, a 38-week program for NCOs in ranks E7 and above. A number of colleges, including the University of Maryland's University College and Hawaii Pacific College have agreed to grant more than one year of undergraduate credit toward a baccalaureate degree to those NCOs who successfully complete the program.

To support the postgraduate educational programs, especially the Postgraduate Intelligence Program (see related article), the school launched a vigorous research effort through its new research center. Faculty participation in professional meetings rose dramatically, the school began co-sponsoring area-oriented conferences, and faculty, staff and students were encouraged to submit their research for publication.

The track record for the past two years is impressive. A conference on Africa in September 1982 drew more than 250 scholars, foreign dignitaries, and members of government and industry. A second conference on the Middle East in June 1983 was attended by over 200 participants. Proceedings from both conferences have been widely disseminated. (Limited copies may be requested by writing the Director of Research, Defense Intelligence College, Washington, D.C. 20301-6111.) Another publication, the **Bibliography of Intelligence Literature**, will be coming out in its eighth edition this fall. Requests for the bibliography come from as far away as Europe and Africa.

Faculty research and publication has also been stimulated. In addition to numerous articles placed in

journals such as **Air University Review, U.S. Naval War College Review, American Intelligence Journal, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,** and **Armed Forces Journal International,** several full-length books have been published and others are due for publication this year. Among the titles already available are Navy Cmdr. Bruce Watson's **Red Navy at Sea** (1982), Watson and Dunn's **Military Lessons of the Falkland Island War** (1983) and Douglas Hunter's **Political/Military Applications of Bayesian Analysis** (1984). Forthcoming are books on military intelligence and the universities, American intervention in Grenada, the Israeli-Lebanon conflict, and the Soviet navy.

Recognition of program quality by the academic community, new vitality within the school's faculty, and leadership committed to upgrading every aspect of the school to high military and civilian standards each contributed to DoD's decision to recharter the school as the Defense Intelligence College. The new name, and an enhanced mission that now formally includes a research component, became effective January 1983. Exactly six months later, the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools' Commission on Higher Education awarded the college full accreditation. Accredited status assures among other things that the MSSI degree is recognized by the military services as well as academia, and that transfer of individual course credits to other institutions is facilitated.

Following accreditation, the college turned its attention to immediate and long-range institutional goals. These include improving the management and support of education and training. Two developments that will play an important role in achieving that goal are the college's new home in the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center, a brand new facility located on the grounds of Bolling AFB in Washington, D.C., and the imminent implementation of a fully automated managment information system.

Another goal is to increase responsiveness to student and user needs in education and training. This is already happening in a number of areas. The college expects to nearly double its current enrollments by 1986 through the use of mobile training teams. Faculty members will be taking selected courses to various sites in the United States and overseas to make them accessible to a much larger audience. Resident courses will continue to be evaluated on a yearly basis to ensure that they meet student and user requirements. The college will also begin to offer new specialty programs which will qualify Army officers for the 35B specialty and Air Force officers for the 8016 and 8096 designation.

As the Defense Intelligence College looks toward the future it does so with pride in what has been achieved and growing confidence in what lies ahead. As the Middle States evaluation report on the college stated, " . . . the nation's intelligence community needs the very best professionals . . . The Defense Intelligence College has stated excellence as a goal and it is in transition toward that goal. The nation neither deserves nor can tolerate any less." ★

Dr. Hugo A. Keesing is director of Institutional Analysis at the Defense Intelligence College.

The Postgraduate Intelligence Program

by Capt. Nancy Morales

Each year a limited number of Army military intelligence officers are selected to attend the Postgraduate Intelligence Program in lieu of the MI Officers' Advanced Course. The program is conducted by the Defense Intelligence College at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C. The program is designed for military intelligence officers from each of the four services.

The course is a graduate level nine- to 12-month program that can lead to a master of science degree in Strategic Intelligence. The first nine months are devoted to a series of courses in strategic intelligence. They are designed to prepare the student to research and write a thesis in strategic intelligence, either during a three-month resident extension at the college or during the next duty assignment.

Currently, courses cover the general areas of analytical methodologies and techniques, national organization and management, area assessments, and strategic intelligence operations. Each PGIP student is required to take specific core courses, plus electives. The elective system allows students to do such things as concentrate on Soviet studies, earn an indications and warnings certificate or do preparatory work for a thesis in a wide variety of topics.

The PGIP provides the opportunity for Army intelligence officers with a good tactical background to attend a course that focuses on strategic-level intelligence. Additionally, the location and resources available to the students in the Capitol area offer the student an extremely valuable experience. The college regularly hosts excellent guest speakers, primarily from the various agencies of the national foreign intelligence community, through its enrichment lecture program.

Army intelligence officers are selected by MILPERCEN to attend the PGIP each year based on their tactical experience and record of performance. Although Defense Intelligence College attendance is in lieu of the resident MIOAC, each officer selected must complete the MIOAC by correspondence prior to arrival at the Defense Intelligence College. ★

Capt. Nancy Morales, a USAICS instructor, is currently finishing work towards a master's of science in Strategic Intelligence through the PGIP.

Tactical Intelligence: How Do Agents Fit In?

by Major Michael E. Phenenger

Intelligence is the commodity that enables the Army to bring decisive combat power to bear on an illusive insurgent force; however, our Vietnam experience has shown that producing an accurate, timely intelligence product in an insurgent environment is a complex, demanding task. Traditional sources of tactical intelligence — agents, prisoners, ralliers, captured documents, enemy communications, visual and photographic reconnaissance and friendly tactical units — have been supplemented by a family of sophisticated sensors: Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS), side looking airborne radar (SLAR), infrared heat detectors, and the "people sniffer." Tactical intelligence officers must assemble raw data from all of these sources and evaluate, analyze, interpret and integrate it to develop a finished intelligence estimate.

Effective evaluation and use of information from any source requires that the source's capabilities and limitations be identified and related to the environment. This requirement has compelled intelligence analysts to develop creative approaches for processing raw data.

Agents are one of the most lucrative, yet problematic sources of intelligence. Vietnam illustrated that agents are likely to produce information of significantly greater value in an insurgency than in a conventional conflict; however, the effective exploitation of agent information in Vietnam was limited by a widespread lack of appreciation for evaluating their reports.

Consumer attitudes and limitations inhibited the effective exploitation of agent reports in Vietnam. Americans are culturally predisposed to place excessive reliance on "gadgetry," the products of our technology. This tendency spilled over into the intelligence field. The attractiveness of intelligence "gadgets" is easily explained. Photography and sensor "readouts,"

for example, are neutral, unambiguous and concrete; they indicate a specific condition or activity at a designated location. By contrast, agent reports provide the most subjective, least concrete information available to the tactical intelligence officer. An agent's perception is affected by his intelligence, experience, educational level, state of training (e.g., ability to read maps and identify weapons) and physical capacity. Report content is also influenced by the opinions, assumptions and predispositions of the agent. Racial, linguistic and cultural differences between Americans and the indigenous population tended to lower our estimate of the indigenous agent's credibility and adversely affected our ability to evaluate his reports. This attitude of distrust reinforced our tendency to rely on technical collection means. A final consumer factor which limited the effective integration of agent reports in Vietnam was the fact that many personnel with little or no formal intelligence training were involved in the evaluation and use of the product. Most brigade and battalion S2s had only limited intelligence training and tactical commanders and advisors were similarly handicapped. Such personnel generally tended to distrust agent reports because combat operations based on agent information frequently failed to produce significant results. In most instances, however, such failures should have been attributed to the users' lack of training and inability to effectively process the information at their disposal.

The consumer's task was complicated by the fact that all difficulties traditionally associated with the use of agents were intensified in the insurgent environment. In Vietnam, the countryside was saturated with low-level agents. The majority were illiterate and most received little if any training which would enhance the

accuracy of their reports on enemy organization, strength, capabilities, vulnerabilities and intentions. The number of agents who actually penetrated the Communist apparatus and had the requisite placement and access to provide first-hand information concerning insurgent operations was small. Most agents provided only limited area coverage, that is, they reported what they saw and heard in areas where they lived, worked, and traveled. Though report volume depended on the level of enemy activity, the size and characteristics of the area of interest and the number and effectiveness of collection agencies serving the area, our saturation tactics produced a massive output of low-level agent reports. Developing efficient, effective procedures for processing these reports posed a serious challenge to tactical intelligence officers.

Evaluation too, was complicated by the fact that many agent reports were (or appeared to be) contradictory. This condition resulted, in part, from the ill-defined nature of the insurgency where confusion was the normal state of affairs. Contradictions also stemmed from deception practiced equally by agents who found the fabrication of reports a lucrative profession, by agents who were covertly sympathetic to the enemy, and finally, by the insurgents who spread misinformation in hope that it would be picked up and reported to government forces.

Though there were significant variations in the quality of reporting between collection agencies, low-level agent reports were likely to be deficient in vital respects. Untimeliness posed the most serious problem. It was frequently several days between the actual collection of information and the dissemination of a report to consumers. The evaluator's problem was complicated by the fact that collection agencies sometimes failed to exercise sufficient care in differentiating between the date of the information and the date of the report. Consumers also had to account for the fact that reports submitted to them were frequently second-hand and possibly third-hand, with each agent frequently distorting the final product by performing his own evaluation and analysis prior to reporting. Finally, agent reports rarely contained enough information on the method and circumstances of collection to afford analysts the luxury of attaching much significance to single reports.

The collection agency's inflated evaluation of its agents often trapped unwary consumers into attaching undue importance to reports.

Collection personnel sometimes lost both their perspective and their sense of humor when consumer evaluations of their reports betrayed skepticism, cynicism, or irreverence.

Intelligence consumers faced with these difficulties exhibited widely divergent reactions. Many were so conscious of the pitfalls inherent in the use of agent reports that they prematurely discounted or ignored them, relying instead on information from more

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concrete, objective sources. In the May-June 1970 edition of Infantry, Captain Frank G. Watkins, omitted all mention of agent reports in his otherwise interesting discussion of intelligence sources available to "The Intelligent S-2." Though the reasons for his omission are unknown, it is relatively certain that agent reports did not play a significant role in the development of his intelligence estimates.

Other consumers appeared unaware of problems associated with the evaluation and use of agent reports, or simply disregarded them. Some utilized an intuitive approach to estimative intelligence which frequently lead them to attach unwarranted significance to single reports. As a rule, evaluation is best performed by consumers who have access to data from a wide range of sources and who are divorced from the emotion of the collection effort.

Though a number of factors combine to make the integration and use of agent-reported information a difficult task, information from this source is too valuable to neglect. Agents have the capability of collecting significant, sometimes unique, information on the location, morale, intentions, capabilities and limitations of insurgent forces that sophisticated reconnaissance and surveillance techniques cannot duplicate. Agents are likely to be one of the most significant sources of information concerning the composition and activities of the enemy infrastructure, enemy finance and

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Tenth Anniversary
1974-1984

economy activity and the operations of small guerrilla units based on the fringes of populated areas. Such activities are the backbone of an insurgency and they provide valuable clues to the intentions of insurgent main force units. Though an agent's area coverage is limited, he can remain on target for relatively long periods and his ability to collect is not significantly impaired by adverse environmental conditions. Furthermore, agents have the ability to collect

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first-hand information through direct contacts with insurgents and their sympathizers and may even be able to penetrate the insurgent organization.

Agent reports played a major role in developing intelligence which provided early warning of the planned Communist attack on Quang Tri City during the 1968 Tet Offensive. No single report contained the enemy's plan of attack or its exact date; however, integrated information from numerous agent reports clearly indicated the enemy's intention to conduct a major assault on the city during early February. Reports correctly identified the arrival of the 812th NVA Regiment to reinforce enemy units operating in Base Area 101 southwest of the city and provided a variety of corroborative details concerning infrastructure and guerrilla activity which tended to confirm reports of the impending attack. One agent reported, for example, that enemy psychological operations units were preparing banners and pamphlets for use in a post-attack victory parade through the city. Agent-reported information integrated with information from other sources provided compelling evidence of the enemy's intentions. As a result, the Vietnamese Province Chief, the Province Senior Advisor, and the local ARVN and U.S. commanders formulated contingency plans for the relief of the city, and Quang Tri Sector forces were placed on alert. In this instance, accurate, timely intelligence based largely on agent reports denied the enemy the

element of surprise and resulted in a major Communist defeat.

Tactical intelligence officers in Vietnam developed a number of techniques to facilitate rapid, accurate evaluation, interpretation, and integration of agent reports. Many employed a system of multiple situation map (SITMAP) overlays for recording information from various categories of sources. Preparation of an agent report overlay enabled analysts to visually observe concentrations of reported activity and quickly check for the development of patterns or trends. Use of multiple overlays also enabled rapid comparison of agent reports with information from other sources (photography, sensor readouts, prisoner interrogations, etc.) to determine whether agent information could be confirmed by other sources. Most successful intelligence officers studiously avoided placing undue emphasis on single agent reports.

Verifiable data contained in agent reports were cross-checked with information from intelligence files. Confirmation of individual details of a report (i.e., the name of an enemy commander, a unit designation or code name, or presence of a unique capability) tends to lend credence to the entire report. Note, however, that caution is required. Such details are sometimes general knowledge, and the analyst should be wary of attaching too much significance to their presence.

Another approach is to compare the information in the report with established patterns of enemy behavior to determine if the enemy has previously acted in a similar manner. Vietnam experience illustrated that insurgent behavior is just as likely to fall into well defined patterns as our own. Knowledge of these patterns is exceptionally valuable in evaluating raw intelligence from any source.

As a final step in processing agent reports, the tactical intelligence officer may wish to reorient and redirect the collection effort in an attempt to confirm reports which appear significant on the basis of preliminary evaluation. Selection of a specific collection agency will depend primarily on its capability and availability. Capability refers to an agency's ability to collect the information desired. Visual reconnaissance can frequently be used to verify reported enemy unit locations and movements, however, it would not normally be deemed capable of confirming reports of infrastructure or guerrilla activity. Since most tactical intelligence is perishable, timeliness is an important factor in choosing a collection agency. Collection assets controlled and tasked

by the command echelon at which the interested officer is assigned are normally the most responsive.

Though the use of these techniques enables rapid, accurate processing of a large volume of reports, evaluation should not be considered a simple, mechanical process. Technique must be supplemented by the knowledge, insight and intuition of an experienced intelligence analyst. There are some things the intelligence officer can do to enhance his personal effectiveness. Highest priority is the acquisition of a thorough knowledge of his area of interest. The tactical intelligence officer must have an accurate mental picture of the terrain represented on his SITMAP, be aware of its military potential, and be familiar with the map's inaccuracies. This knowledge can only be attained by extensive aerial and ground reconnaissance to develop a feel for the area which will immeasurably enhance his ability to evaluate raw data. Newly assigned officers should also conduct a thorough review of available intelligence files to obtain background information on significant patterns of enemy behavior. Intelligence agencies have an obligation to maintain accurate, "turn-over files" to assist newly assigned personnel.

Finally, the tactical intelligence officer can take steps to improve the quality and usefulness of agent reports submitted by local collection agencies. First, he can exercise the frequently neglected opportunity to provide the collection agency with a detailed evaluation of each report, thus insuring that the agency has reliable data on which to base agent evaluations. Secondly, he can insure that agents operating in his area of interest are specifically tasked to collect information supporting his requirements. Finally, he can influence the quality of support by establishing close, personal liaison with collection agencies. Such contacts will provide both consumers and collectors with an insight into the other's problems and assist in the resolution of difficulties and misunderstandings.

Human agents are unquestionably one of the most valuable sources of information in an insurgency. Potential consumers must have an appreciation of their capabilities and limitations, and of techniques for integrating and using agent reports in the preparation of a complete intelligence product to satisfy the commander's information requirements. In Vietnam, the consumer's failure to understand the complex nature of the source frequently led to the neglect or misuse of their product. Either

situation is regrettable. Producing an intelligence estimate is akin to assembling a jigsaw puzzle. An arbitrary decision not to use some of the pieces or to use only blue ones will result in an incomplete picture just as forcing pieces into the wrong position will distort the result. In the hands of a trained intelligence officer, information from human sources can be analyzed, evaluated and integrated into the intelligence estimate where it will fill important gaps in our understanding on the enemy situation.

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HOW WELL DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE AGGRESSOR FIELD MANUALS?

Try this Quiz using FM's to 102 and to 101 (Answers on page 15)

1. The Military Intelligence Branch is one of the Non combat Branches under the Directorate of Rear Services within the Aggressor organizational structure. TRUE or FALSE

2. What is the mission of the Aggressor Third Defense Belt?

3. The Code Name of the 6th Artillery Division is _____

4. How many CRIMs are in the unit commanded by COL the SAUD?

5. The normal frontage of an Aggressor Motorized Rifle Battalion in a defensive deployment would be:
a. 17 - 24 km
b. 4000 m
c. 1.5 - 2.5 km
d. 5000 - 8000 m

6. How many divisions subordinate to the unit with code number _____ have an area of operations in Arizona?

IEW

Support of

FTX

Hardened Steel VIII

By Maj. John D. Skelton

The 522d MI Battalion of the 2d Armored Division, like other divisional "CEWI" battalions, has a two-fold responsibility: to prepare itself to go to war, and to assist in preparing the division to operate in an intensive electronic warfare environment. During the Hardened Steel VIII field training exercise conducted by the 2d Armored Division from March 27 to April 5, 1984, the 522d MI Battalion, in coordination with the division G2, accomplished both responsibilities.

Intelligence and electronic warfare planning started several months before the FTX. The following actions were initiated early in the planning phase:

- Begin concept development/task organization.
- Identify non-2AD participants.
- Request frequency/power clearance for electronic countermeasures operations.
- Establish objectives.

Hardened Steel VIII featured a Blue Force and an Orange Force. The 2d Armored Division (-) constituted the Blue Force. IEW support to the Blue Forces was provided by the 522d MI Battalion (-); the 523d ASA Company (USAR) from Minnesota; and one collection/jamming platoon from C Company, 163d MI Battalion, 504th MI Group.

The 523d ASA Company (USAR), a division support company organized under the old series MTOE 32-57, was employed as an electronic warfare company to offset giving up the 522d MI Battalion's EW company to the Orange Force.

The platoon from the 163d MI Battalion represented a corps CEWI unit reinforcing a divisional unit. The 523d ASA Company and the platoon from the 163d MI Battalion pooled resources to organize a Blue TCAE to control the Blue SIGINT/EW assets. The second platoon (-) of A Company , 522d MI remained with the division's 2d Brigade to support the Blue Force. This was done to provide training in preparation for deploying to the National Training Center in May 1984 with the 2d Brigade.

The Orange Force, consisting of elements of the 6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat) and elements of the 1st Battalion, 66th Armor, and other selected 2AD combat units received IEW support from the Electronic Warfare Company (-), 522d MI battalion; the technical control and analysis element, 522d MI Battalion; two radio intercept (AN/TRQ-37) teams from the 404th ASA Company (USAR); one platoon of ground surveillance radars from the 312th MI Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division; one ECM team, using a RACAL ECM set, from the 311th MI Battalion of the 101st Airborne Division (AA); and a Quickfix platoon, 502d Aviation Battalion, 2d Armored Division.

The following IEW training objectives were established:

• **Train division SIGINT/EW assets and the TCAE to operate against a multibrigade-sized force.**
• **Provide jamming environment for division radio operators to experience.**
• **Ascertain how the division is electronically portrayed to the enemy. This is a critical perspective needed to enhance operations security and deception planning.**
• **Develop concepts for electronic templating and emitter location correlation.**
• **Integrate Corps IEW elements to reinforce divisional IEW assets.**
• **Train/evaluate Reserve component IEW units.**

The 504th MI Group also provided personnel to serve as controllers and to support a Corps intelligence response cell. The 312th MI Battalion from the 1st Cavalry Division made an additional contribution by providing vehicle and equipment support to the 523d ASA Company. All IEW training objectives were accomplished and the spirit of cooperation, characterizing various MI units involved, reflect a trend of training together *today* so that IEW soldiers can pro-

vide IEW support to tactical commanders *tomorrow*. The Electronic Research and Development Command (ERADCOM) also contributed to the success of the exercise by cutting through red tape to permit the 522d MI Battalion to take its soon to be issued AN/MSQ-103 systems to the field for the exercise. The systems supported the Orange Force and performed well. Newly trained AN/MSQ-103 operators "got the feel" of wartime operations. To those who still perceive that MI soldiers have "rear echelon" type jobs, note that one AN/GLQ-3B and one AN/MSQ-103 (sorry, ERADCOM) were captured by advancing Blue Force elements. This experience reinforces the need to tie forward deployed IEW assets into the forward area commander's plans to minimize such losses.

From an IEW perspective the Hardened Steel VIII FTX was a success on many fronts. Commanders of the division were exposed to an ECM environment somewhat akin to that which can be expected in war. SIGINT/EW personnel were afforded the opportunity to work in a target rich environment. Procedures and techniques for SIGINT/EW operations were further refined. The matter of integrating corps EW elements in a reinforcing role was addressed.

The 2d Armored Division was given an assessment of how the division portrays itself to a sophisticated enemy IEW capability. Blue Force commanders and staffs were briefed following the exercise on how their respective units portrayed themselves to the Orange IEW capability. This perspective will improve our OPSEC and minimize losses during war as well as support deception planning. The challenge of providing IEW support to fast-paced night armor operations, characterized by frequent displacements, was met.

The contribution of the ground surveillance radar to detect and identify enemy formations at night or during smoke-covered operations was once again demonstrated. The GSR generated combat information directly for the battalion task force. Therefore, most battalion commanders quickly recognized it as the *source* of timely information about the enemy, whereas the sources of information generated by other IEW collection agencies was less clearly defined.

The Hardened Steel VIII FTX demonstrated that the divisional MI battalion, with support from other active and Reserve component MI units, can train to accomplish its wartime mission, while at the same time contributing directly to preparing the rest of the division to operate against a force employing state of the art IEW systems. ★

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Cryptocorner solution

CLARK	GIAP
EISENHOWER	WELLINGTON
CLAUSEWITZ	MACARTHUR
ALEXANDER	DOOLITTLE
FARRAGUT	PERSHING
GRANT	JONES
NAPOLEON	YAMAMOTO
JACKSON	BRADLEY
ATTILA	PATTON
CUSTER	HALSEY
ZHUKOV	NELSON
ROMMEL	CAESAR
LEE	FREDERICK THE GREAT
DAYAN	GENGHIS KHAN
SHERIDAN	MAO TSE TUNG

"When the best leader's work is done the people say, We did it ourselves!' "

THE ANALYTIC LEAP

All men are mortal.
(MAJOR PREMISE)
Socrates is a man.
(MINOR PREMISE)
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
(CONCLUSION)

by Maj. Richard Armstrong

Intelligence is not information alone, but also judgment. Judgment is the reasoning process applied by analysts or other intelligence personnel during the analysis of gathered information. Within the intelligence cycle of collection, analysis, production and dissemination, analysis is a critical but vaguely understood process. Analysis is unlike collection and dissemination which are relatively direct in application. In collection, one identifies the means for targeting against the desired sources of information, and in dissemination one either succeeds or fails in getting the intelligence to the consumer in a timely fashion. Analysis does not have the same assuredness of method. Since finished intelligence cannot be gathered by collecting, it must be produced from analysis. To pass from what is positively known in specific information reports to the unknown in generalized intelligence estimates of the enemy situation, intelligence analysts generally employ the method of inductive, and sometimes deductive, reasoning. An analyst cannot continue collecting and collating bits of information without continually identifying their bearing on, and their relative importance in, the general situation. A large number of reports will be contradictory, an even greater number incorrect, and the majority,

indefinite. Consequently, the intelligence estimate is the result of a delicate analytical process which demands a certain subtlety of understanding of the reasoning process and the pitfalls that exist.

Analysis presupposes an accurate knowledge of the various forms of reasoning, clear thinking, and the conscious avoidance of error. The conclusion of an analyst's intelligence estimate must be consistently drawn from true premises.

The aim of this article is to help analysts become self-aware and self-critical as they improve their individual performance. Unfortunately, intelligence analysts usually receive little or no formal training in logic and reasoning—this is left to experience for refinement of an analyst's intelligence and purposeful application of analysis.

The analytic process is the product of a long history of formalized logic. In the fourth century B.C., Aristotle wrote down definite rules for judging arguments and for avoiding errors in reasoning. According to Aristotle, all knowledge is achieved through deduction or induction.

Deductive reasoning is the process in which the premises guarantee the conclusion. If the premises are accepted, then the conclusion must be accepted as well, as can be shown

In the classic logic example:

All men are mortal. (Major premise)
Socrates is a man. (Minor premise)
Therefore, Socrates is mortal. (Conclusion)

Such a deductive statement is correctly said to be valid only when the conclusion follows from valid premises. There can be nothing in the conclusion of a deductive statement that did not first appear in the premises.

To set up a valid deductive statement with information reports as premises for an intelligence estimate is impossible. The premises, based on various sources of information, cannot establish a major premise that is always valid. For example:

Whenever artillery is forward the enemy attacks. (Major premise)
The enemy's 69th Artillery division is forward. (Minor premise)
Therefore, the enemy will attack. (Conclusion)

Although the form of the statement may suggest a valid conclusion, the material truth is missing in the major premise, for example, **whenever** implies that all enemy attacks have artillery forward. This implied "all" for an enemy attack is impossible to validate as a major premise and can lead to a false conclusion. There are situations when the enemy may attack without artillery forward: the enemy is using deception, their attack is poorly coordinated, or they have changed their method of combat. The material truth in reasoning follows the truth of the premises as statements of fact. It is simply not fact that all enemy attacks will have artillery forward. Consequently, induction, rather than deduction, is the more legitimate reasoning process for developing an intelligence estimate from a collection of individual information reports.

Induction is the reasoning process for weighing observed evidence in order to arrive at a proposition governing that evidence. Everyone uses this same inductive logic in daily decisions or in reasoning. T.H. Huxley used as his famous example, the man who bites successively into three hard, green apples, only to discover that each is sour, then concludes that all hard, green apples are sour.

Inductive reasoning rests on probabilities derived from the collected information and the analyst's experience. Probabilities are derived from experience. Because a probability is what usually happens or what is believed to happen, the example has persuasive value. However, nothing in inductive logic requires that future events of a certain kind be like past events. Differences are always possible. Ten times, or 50 times in a row the enemy may have massed his armor and moved his artillery well forward for an attack; but on the 11th, or 51st time, these premises used in the analyst's estimate may not be correct.

Although induction expresses only probabilities, the more often associations of events occur in the past, the more likely they are to occur in the future. Nothing is certain, however; the exception can always slip through this gap in induction.

By its very nature an inductive argument is one that is invalid as a deductive statement. The conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises, such as:

The BMP regiment of the threat 10th Motorized Rifle Division has been used in exploitation from the second echelon.
The 11th, 12th, and 13th MRDs contain BMP regiments that have been used in exploitation from the second echelon.
Therefore, all MRDs will use BMP regiments for exploitation from the second echelon.

We have examined 50 threat tanks, model T-62, and discovered that all of them have too much engine vibration for crew comfort.
All threat tanks, model T-62, will have too much engine vibration for crew comfort.

In each of these statements the premises present reasons for accepting the conclusion. But the reasons are not complete evidence, and in fact, some might not regard the evidence as adequate for accepting the conclusion.

Neither implicitly nor explicitly is the conclusion of an inductive statement contained in the premises. When analysts are reasoning inductively, they are generalizing and passing from the known to the unknown. The conclusion always goes beyond the premises. Unlike the premises of a valid deductive statement that guarantees or proves the conclusion, the premises of an inductive statement do not. They only support, make likely, give some reasons or evidence for, or confirm the conclusion.

The conclusion always commits analysts to more than is in the premises; there is a gap between the premises and conclusion in inductive reasoning. This is the famous inductive logic leap that becomes the analytic leap. A leap from which analysts run a terrible risk of falling into lost depth. The conclusion may turn out to be false. In short, though the chance of falling into the depth is greater in some cases than it is in others, it is nonetheless ever present. The analyst has to live dangerously. The only way to reach any conclusion at all is by taking a risk.

The premises of an inductive statement are supposed to supply the basis or reasons for its conclusion. The premises support the conclusion, and obviously enough, the support they provide can range from "none at all," through "moderate," to "overwhelming." Because of this range, an analyst considers the degree of confirmation of the conclusion.

For example:

A one hour artillery preparation precedes almost every enemy attack.
The enemy is firing a one hour artillery preparation.
The enemy will attack.

This is a highly confirmed conclusion by its premises. (Note: this statement would be valid deductive statement if it was EVERY enemy attack...)
An example of a low confirmed conclusion:

The effort of enemy attack helicopters to stop an armor reserve from counterattacking was successful.
All efforts of enemy attack helicopters will be successful.

There is more to evaluating intelligence estimates than merely determining whether or not the premise confirms the conclusion to such a degree that an analyst would be comfortable in accepting the conclusion.

First, there must be sufficient reason to accept the premises of an intelligence estimate. An analyst would like to know that the premises, or information reports, are true. If the analyst regards the evidence supporting the premises to be sufficient to accept them as true, then he should have little hesitation about using the reports as a premise to establish a conclusion. In short, before the analyst is willing to say that an intelligence estimate is adequate, he requires that its premises be accepted as adequately grounded, confirmed by other reports or sources.

Second, the premise must be relevant to the conclusion. If the premises of an intelligence estimate had nothing to do with its conclusion, then the analyst could not consider them as confirming the conclusion. To confirm the conclusion they have to count for it, and in order to do this they have to be pertinent to it. An irrelevant premise or statement of fact does not disconfirm the conclusion, but it does not confirm it either. It just does not count either way. This reminds one of the saying, "An elegant answer to an irrelevant question is still irrelevant."

Third, the evidence or reasons supplied by the premise must be adequate for the acceptance of the conclusion. Exactly when premises supply sufficient grounds is difficult to say. In practice, analysts accept some estimates as good and reject others as bad. Sometimes analysts just do not know what to think. Sometimes they have to decide whether to accept or reject a conclusion on the evidence available at the time and in the present situation. In such cases, the analyst may realize that the evidence is inadequate, that the conclusion is not an adequate estimate; yet for some reason such as a tactical situation they cannot afford to delay judgment. So there is sometimes a distinction between accepting the conclusion of an estimate and regarding the conclusion as adequately established or established as true.

Fourth, in judging the adequacy of an intelligence estimate analysts have to take into account relevant information which might make a difference in their conclusions. They would take into account all relevant information. But that is generally impossible simply because of practical limitations in collecting information. If they formulate an estimate at all, then they have to offer them at some given time, and we cannot just wait around until "all the information is in." In some cases, all the evidence can never be in because there is always future evidence to consider and there is an inexhaustible amount of it.

Relevant information available at the time the estimate is offered has to be considered because it may provide a reason for rejecting or modifying the estimate's conclusion. An estimate may have a conclusion that is highly confirmed by its premises and still be inadequate and unacceptable. This can happen simply because all information which would disconfirm the conclusion of the argument has been ignored.

With a hypothesis about what "every" threat tank unit does in an offensive battle drill, the analyst must modify his hypothesis when he encounters the first case of a threat tank unit that does not execute as he hypothesized. He has to change it to something like "almost every" threat tank unit. If he runs into several more disconfirming cases, he has to retreat another step, to what "most" threat tank units do. The more contrary cases the analyst encounters the further he has to retreat: "many," "some," "a few" "at least one," and finally, "no threat tank units." The analyst continues to weaken his claim until he may finally have to abandon it. This accounts for the heavy sprinklings of "probable" and "possible" and other such qualifiers in intelligence products. A generous application of such qualifiers can weaken confidence in the conclusion. A judicious use of the qualifiers will convey the degree of confirmation in the conclusion.

Nonetheless, an intelligence estimate which considered only favorable cases would have a highly confirmed conclusion and give every appearance of being adequate. But, it would give this appearance only by ignoring disconfirming cases and thus "loading" its premises. This is the danger in preconceived notions by analysts or consumers of intelligence. To judge the adequacy of an intelligence estimate, then, analysts have to step outside of the premises and ask whether they are fair.

The analyst must keep the situation constantly before him by gathering as much corroborative or contradictory facts as possible. Each item of information is automatically considered as a possible link in a chain of circumstantial evidence which may finally lead to a certain estimate.

In quick summary, an adequate inductive statement is one that has: 1) adequately established premises; 2) premises that are relevant to the conclusion; 3) premises that confirm the conclusion to an acceptable degree (whatever this may be depending on the situation); and 4) premises that represent fairly the relevant information.

The successful analyst must be diligent, adroit, patient, and courageous. Information regarding the enemy in war will never be complete, but the analyst who understands the enemy and logical probabilities, in many situations, will be able to discern the capabilities and intentions of the enemy, based on the bits of information available. The analyst must clear away the mist caused by information gaps. The good analyst must be less concerned with a reputation for infallibility than with the integrity of his judgment. ★

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Crossword Puzzle

MILITARY HISTORY II

by Capt. Rudolph N. Garcia

ACROSS CLUES

3. BRITISH GENERAL, SURRENDERED AT YORKTOWN, 1781.
7. NAPOLEON DEFEATED PRUSSIA IN THIS BATTLE IN 1806.
9. HEROINE OF THE FRENCH RESISTANCE DURING WW2.
10. HE WROTE "THE INFLUENCE OF SEA-POWER UPON HISTORY."
11. BRITISH TROOPS WERE GIVEN THIS BEVERAGE BEFORE COMBAT AT WATERLOO.
12. "THE BIG RED ---."
13. NORMAN KING WHO CONQUERED BRITAIN IN 1066.
16. ABBR. FOR ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLE.
17. 17TH/18TH CENTURY FRENCH MARSHAL WHO WAS MASTER DESIGNER AND BUILDER OF FORTIFICATIONS.
19. HE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR DEFEATING THE COMBINED SPANISH AND FRENCH FLEETS AT TRAFALGAR, 1805.
20. GERMAN FIELD MARSHAL RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PLAN TO ATTACK THE ALLIES IN MAY, 1940.
23. CHURCHILL'S ANCESTOR WHO DEFEATED THE FRANCO-BAVARIAN ARMY AT BLENHEIM, 1704.
24. AT AGE 26, HE WAS A GENERAL WHO DEFEATED THE AUSTRIAN ARMY IN NORTHERN ITALY.
25. CONFEDERATE GENERAL WHO NEVER RECEIVED A DEMERIT AT WEST POINT.
29. GREEK GENERAL WHOSE FORCES CON-QUERED MOST OF THE KNOWN WORLD'S 323 BC.
30. A SMALL UNIT OF THE BRITISH ARMY REPULSED REPEATED ATTACKS FROM THIS TYPE WARRIOR IN 1869.
31. HITLER'S ELITE TROOPS USED FOR CONCENTRATION CAMP AND FRONTLINE DUTIES.
32. POPULAR NAME FOR GERMANS IN WW1.
36. GERMAN GENERAL, LEADER DEVELOPER OF THE PANZERS IN THE 1930'S.
38. -------- THE GREAT SAID,"IT IS PARDONABLE TO BE DEFEATED, BUT NEVER SURPRISED."
39. GERMAN FIELD MARSHAL WHO SURRENDERED AT STALINGRAD, 1943.

DOWN CLUES

1. ALLIED CODE NAME FOR THE JAPANESE ZERO.
2. HIS TROOPS STOPPED THE TIDE OF MOSLEM EXPANSION AT TOURS, 732 AD.
4. UNION GENERAL WHO "MARCHED TO THE SEA."
5. SOVIET FIELD MARSHAL RESPONSIBLE FOR TAKING BERLIN IN 1945.
6. MOBILIZED ARABS TO FIGHT THE TURKS IN PALESTINE, WW1.
8. NAPOLEON'S FAVORITE FIELD MARSHAL OF CAVALRY.
9. ROMMEL'S FAVORITE TACTIC IN N. AFRICA WAS TO OUT----- THE ENEMY'S LINE.
14. CDR OF FRENCH 2AD, WHOSE TROOPS WERE THE FIRST TO ENTER PARIS IN 1944.
15. LOUIS XIV'S MOST FAVORITE AND SUCCESSFUL FIELD MARSHAL.
18. MOST SUCCESSFUL SWEDISH GENERAL OF THE THIRTY YEARS WAR.
19. U.S. ADMIRAL RESPONSIBLE FOR THE JAPANESE DEFEAT AT MIDWAY, 1942. (CINCPAC).
21. PRUSSIAN GENERAL WHO DEVISED THE PLAN TO DEFEAT THE ALLIES IN 1914.
22. KNOWN AS "THE ROCK OF CHICKAMAUGA."
26. CROSSED THE ALPS ON ELEPHANTS TO INVADE ITALY.
27. THE HERO OF VERDUN.
33. PERIOD IN HISTORY FROM 1815 TO 1914 IS KNOWN AS --- BRITANNICA.
33. CDR OF U.S. FORCES AT SARATOGA, 1777.
34. WERE FIRST USED AT CAMBRAI, 1916 TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK IN TRENCH WARFARE.
35. U.S. TROOPS, IN WOOL UNIFORMS, INVADED THIS TROPICAL ISLAND IN 1898.
36. THE SOLE SURVIVOR OF THE TORPEDO 8 SQDN. FROM THE U.S.S. HORNET AT MIDWAY, 1942.
37. NAPOLEON'S FIELD MARSHAL KNOWN AS THE "BRAVEST OF THE BRAVE," AND "PRINCE OF THE MOSKAWA."

THE
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
STRUCTURE

by Capt. Nancy Morales

The U.S. national foreign intelligence community is a relatively new organization, yet a very dynamic one. Prior to World War II, the United States saw little necessity for a national organization to provide intelligence during peacetime. However, World War II provided a tremendous lesson on the importance of intelligence not only during a war but also in times of peace.

The United States learned a great deal from the British during World War II, in particular, about the Office of Strategic Services. This organization spearheaded the intelligence effort during the war and would later become the basis for today's intelligence structure.

Although the OSS itself was disbanded after the war, the need for an intelligence organization was recognized by U.S. policy makers, and in 1947 the National Security Act was passed by Congress. The National Security Act, along with its amendment, remain the cornerstone legislation for the intelligence community today. The purpose of the act is defined in Section 2: ". . . it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the government relating to the national security; to provide a Department of Defense, including the three military Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense, but not to merge these department or services; . . ."

The act also established the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, with a director of Central Intelligence and a deputy director.

In recent years, the president has provided further guidelines for the intelligence community through openly published Executive Orders. Following a lengthy congressional investigation in 1976, President Ford issued EO 11905, U.S. Foreign Intelligence Activities, to publicly impose restrictions on intelligence organizations. Another purpose was to replace classifed National Security Council intelligence directives that had been declassified as a result of legal actions based on the Freedom of Information Act.

President Carter followed in the steps of his predecessor when he issued EO 12036, U.S. Intelligence Activities. He intended to go one step further with extensive legislation, but the 263 page National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978 died without ever being reported to the Senate floor.

President Reagan's imprint on the intelligence community came in the form of EO 12333. The most significant difference in this one and its predecessors is in its positive rather than negative tone, telling the agencies within the intelligence community what they can do rather than what they cannot do, as EO 12036 had done.

To assist and advise the president on national security, several organizations and positions have been established. Among these are the National Security Council, the special assistant to the president for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence as well as the members of the intelligence community. Members of the community today include the CIA, FBI, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Department of Energy, Department of State, Department of the Treasury, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency and the Reconnaissance Program Offices.

First, let's look at the National Security Council. Established by the National Security Act of 1947, the council has functioned as an advisory body to the president. In addition to the president, who is the chairman, the voting members include the vice president, secretary of defense, secretary of state, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the DCI and the special assistant for national security affairs. The council may establish committees as necessary to assist them. At the present time, the major supporting organizations are the Senior Interdepartmental Group-Intelligence, and the Interdepartmental Groups-Intelligence. Since each president has used the NSC to support his own individual approach, the formality and regularity of meetings and the impact of the council have varied greatly throughout its history. And in consonance with its role in each administration, the size and number of committees or subordinate elements, whatever they may be called, have also varied.

EO 12333 tasked the NSC to advise the president on the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to national security. It is the highest executive entity that has responsibility to review and provide guidance for all national foreign intelligence, counterintelligence and special activities.

The role of the DCI has also changed to some extent with each administration. Since the position was first established in 1947, it has evolved with each president, depending upon the relationship of the president with the DCI, the status of the intelligence community, and Congress. The DCI, who is primary advisor to the president and the NSC on national intelligence, has three major roles: to produce national intelligence, to coordinate intelligence activities, and to direct the CIA. More specifically, these responsibilities include the development of objectives and guidance for the intelligence community and the transition of NSC priorities and objectives into specific guidance for

members of the community. Additionally, the DCI is responsible for the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget and its implementation.

All members of the intelligence community are influenced by changes in administrations and executive orders, but to a lesser degree than the NSC and the DCI. Their responsibilities have been outlined recently by President Reagan's EO 12333.

The CIA is responsible for the collection, production and dissemination of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. They conduct counterintelligence activities, and coordinate the intelligence and information collected by other community members outside the United States. If operations are conducted within the United States, they must be coordinated with the FBI. The CIA is the only member of the intelligence community authorized to conduct special activities, as approved by the president.

The Department of State, through the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, overtly collects information in the area of U.S. foreign policy. They are responsible for the dissemination of reports from their missions abroad, and for sending requirements to their overseas missions in support of the intelligence community members. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research also participates in the preparation of national intelligence estimates.

The Department of Defense, with all its intelligence organizations, is the largest consumer of intelligence within the community and controls 90 percent of the intelligence budget. Most collection systems are developed and/or operated by DoD personnel, both military and civilian. The primary responsibilities of DoD in the intelligence community are to collect, produce and disseminate foreign military intelligence and information. To assist in this function, DoD directs and operates the National Security Agency, DIA, National Reconnaissance Programs and military intelligence elements of the four services.

The Department of Energy and Department of the Treasury openly collect foreign information in their respective areas of interest and, as consumers, are supported by the other members of the intelligence community. The Treasury Department also

conducts, through the Secret Service, activities to protect the president and other officials, and to determine the existence and capabilities of surveillance equipment which could be used against these individuals.

The FBI is responsible for the collection, production and dissemination of counterintelligence, and the coordination of counterintelligence activities within the United States. Operations that must be conducted outside the United States are coordinated with the CIA and the military services in the area.

This brief description of the intelligence community points out the different roles played by various members. Army intelligence is only one element within the national intelligence community structure, but nevertheless, a very important one. Each of the service intelligence organizations collect, produce and disseminate intelligence in support of their respective services and their different missions. Additionally, each military service responds to national requirements in accordance with DCI guidance and in coordination with the CIA or FBI, as appropriate.

Army military intelligence is represented in each joint service intelligence organization (NSA, DIA) and plays an important role in the DoD intelligence budget process. Each intelligence entity is responsible for its own research and development programs to provide the systems it needs to fulfill requirements for information and intelligence. Each service organization is also part of the national intelligence community and, therefore, must coordinate with and support the other members.

Overseeing each of these organizations as they fulfill their individual missions within the community are the Intelligence Oversight Board, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and Congress.

The three-member Intelligence Oversight Board, established by EO 12334, is concerned with the legality of activities conducted by the various agencies. The members are appointed by the president from outside the government, and are responsible for conducting investigations, if necessary, and reporting to the president, as required.

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, also appointed by

executive order, is a larger organization which consists of citizens from outside the government. Its purpose is to "assess the quality, quantity, and adequacy of intelligence collection, analysis and estimates, counterintelligence, and other intelligence activities." (EO 12331) The board reports directly to the president at least semiannually concerning its findings and appraisals of intelligence community activities.

The congressional oversight organizations, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence are also responsible for oversight of intelligence community activities. For example, all special activities conducted by the CIA must be briefed to, and approved by, these committees prior to initiation. The committees were established in 1976 and 1977 in response to congressional investigations of the intelligence agencies and to consolidate the oversight responsibility within one committee in both the House and Senate, rather than several.

The intelligence community has evolved since 1947 into a large and complex organization with a great variety of resources. This article is an attempt to describe its structure and responsibilities and to explain the impact that the president and the Congress have on this organization. With this information, we can better utilize the people and information resources at our command. ★

Capt. Nancy Morales was graduated in 1976 from the College of St. Benedict, St. Joseph, Minn., with a BA in German and Humanities. She is currently working on a master of science in Strategic Intelligence from the Defense Intelligence College. Morales received an ROTC commission in 1976 and attended the Postgraduate Intelligence Program at DIC in 1983. Previous assignments include the 193rd Infantry Brigade in Panama; G2, 2nd Infantry Division in Korea; and as brigade and battalion S2 with the 32nd Army Air Defense Command in Germany. Morales is currently assigned as an instructor/author at the U.S Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca.

SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

| TERRORISM | UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE | MINOR CONVENTIONAL WARFARE | MAJOR CONVENTIONAL WARFARE | THEATER NUCLEAR | STRATEGIC NUCLEAR |

Figure 1

DEPARTMENTAL STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

by Arthur G. Peterson

In the Army Dictionary, AR 310-25, there are more than two dozen approved definitions of intelligence. Such definitions are designed to ensure consistency and uniformity of usage so the Army can communicate internally and with the other services and allies. Putting all those definitions and associated terms together, however, does not enable one to understand the functioning and purposes involved.

Understanding the process and relationships within the intelligence system which serves the national security structure is a complex problem. Since the 1970s, the Army has been engaged in a dynamic process of developing doctrine to deal with the challenges of the last decades of this century. This process has been the classic "moving train." A useful

way to examine the implications of these dynamic changes is to look at the generic demands for intelligence expressed by the various components of the Army.

Intelligence for national security has three main perspectives: knowledge, organization and activity. An example of intelligence as knowledge is the description of the organization of a combat division in a country; intelligence as organization is the structure used to meet the demands of the Army's training base; and finally, intelligence as activity is the process that goes into supporting a contingency force.

As a starting point for doctrinal review, the Army sought to identify the challenges it must be prepared to face. A well developed baseline for this has been published in FM 100-5,

Operations. The Army must be prepared to fight on both sophisticated and unsophisticated battlefields; and to meet a spectrum of conflict ranging from terrorism to all-out world war. The Army must be ready to conduct rapid and sustained maneuver warfare. The lethality of weapons has increased and even small nations will be able to field significant numbers of sophisticated systems. Modern technology permits more timely and wide-ranging communications, surveillance and target acquisition, with large quantities of information flowing to commanders at all echelons. There continues to be a proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons which alters the nature of future battlefields. The Army will have long lines for support and may, at times, be outnumbered. Rear area conflicts,

urban fighting, and fighting in non-temperate climates are all highly likely. Army forces must be able to effectively respond both professionally and psychologically with reduced warning times.

In analyzing the above requirements against the structure of the Army, four distinct groups of intelligence consumers can be identified: the combat and materiel development community, the operational forces, the training base, and key decision makers at HQDA, DoD, and Congress. To a significant degree, the intelligence requirements of each of these groups overlap, for example, data needed to conduct security assistance operations. At the same time, they each have unique requirements, such as, 20-year projections of force structure and weapons characteristics needed for a cost and operational effectiveness analysis. Figure 2 provides a schematic of these relationships. What should be noted here is that the intelligence requirements of these groups are not conditioned by information source (IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, open source) or functional area (foreign counterintelligence analysis, estimates, foreign economic trends, foreign science and technology). Generally, these groups seek answers to their questions so that meaningful plans and programs can be structured and decided upon. The fact that their needs overlap creates a very complex problem—one person's detailed intelligence is another person's overview.

In studying Figure 2, we can see that intelligence as knowledge covers a wide spectrum of subjects and consumers. Clear division points are not readily apparent. This is also true when the terms strategic and tactical intelligence are used. The real difference is one of application, not necessarily organizational level. Tactical intelligence supports the demands of tactical operations, which are classically combat operations against a hostile foreign force. Tactical intelligence is infrequently required since Army forces are not usually engaged in actual combat operations. The majority of the Army's intelligence assets, however, support tactical or operational units (corps, divisions, separate brigades), so that they will be ready to perform in actual combat situations. Another role is to use the

The Intelligence Community

DIRECTOR of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI)

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

Central Intelligence Agency
Department of State
Department of Energy
Department of the Treasury
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Offices for collection of specialized nat'l foreign intelligence
Defense Intelligence Agency
National Security Agency
Army Intelligence
Navy Intelligence
Air Force Intelligence
Marine Corps Intelligence

Department of Defense Elements
Departmental Intelligence Elements (Other than DoD)
Independent Agency

Figure 2

intelligence provided by echelons above corps, non-Army, and national intelligence agencies to plan for possible operations. These two roles are not totally compatible but they are a fact of life. This situation creates an Army intelligence community which shares interests with the wider national intelligence community, but also has unique characteristics.

The national intelligence community (Figure 3) is comprised of departments and agencies, each with its own perspective on national security problems facing the United States. Many of the challenges which have resulted in the AirLand Battle doctrine have also resulted in the realiza-

tion that the intelligence needed to support combat depends upon *both* strategic and tactical intelligence, which would be developed once forces are engaged. FM 100-16, Echelons above Corps, and FM 100-5, Operations, refer to the criticality of this relationship.

The role of departmental intelligence begins to emerge. As shown in Figure 3, each of the military departments and the Department of Defense have intelligence assets considered part of the national intelligence community. These assets are not only used to satisfy the needs of the wider community as articulated by the Director of Central Intelligence and

PROJECT TAILORED
STUDIES & ESTIMATES

TOPICAL
STUDIES & ESTIMATES

DATA BASE
RESEARCH & PRODUCTION
STUDIES

ARMY CONSUMER COMPLEX

Figure 3

the Secretary of Defense, but also to meet the requirements illustrated in Figure 2.

Consequently, Army intelligence consumers receive large quantities of intelligence from a variety of production centers, all of which respond to specific requirements and needs. One of the greatest challenges facing any departmental or service intelligence community is the management and articulation of requirements. A diverse national intelligence community serving numerous consumer complexes inherently has redundancy and ambiguity. Some of this redundancy is intentional, for example, the concept of competing analysis centers is well established as a national intelligence policy (see Executive Order 12333).

Within this already complex picture is added the relationship between collection, security and production. The goal of intelligence is to contribute to the making of informed decisions, whether they are made by the Chief of Staff or a division commander. Solid analysis is what leads to that goal. The analysis of data drives the collection of data. Further, those charged with directing the analysis must have access to the decision maker to determine the issues, and must aggressively market the intelligence product in decision making forums.

For the Army intelligence community, this complex relationship must be welded together into effective activities. As on a battlefield, management is the control of resources and the balancing of risks; so it is for Army intelligence. No single consumer group can be totally satisfied nor hold dominance over what requirements will be addressed. Risks must be accepted. The primary focus of the Army intelligence community must be upon Army intelligence problems and, secondarily, those of the wider community. In this way, the Army makes a better contribution to the wider community because it is more tightly focused. From an analytic standpoint, the substantive intelligence problems of all Army echelons (including HQDA analytic elements) are linked, and must be made mutually supportive in all theaters of operations. Forums for doing this are currently few and must be expanded. Resources are finite within DoD and competition for them is intense. Fragmentation within the Army intelligence community weakens the Army's position in the competition for resources. Strategic intelligence is the life blood of not only DA level intelligence organizations but corps as well.

The principal activity of Army intelligence is managing information. The collection of data, its transmission to analysts, its organization for analysis, and marketing the intelligence produced are interdependent processes common to all Army echelons individually and collectively. These activities must be organized in a fashion which enables Army intelligence assets to be concentrated on the key substantive areas of Army interest. These key areas must be identified, approaches to each problem organized, and risks implicit in the choice of areas and approaches clearly outlined.

Arthur G. Peterson is currently the Director of Operations, U.S. Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center. He has served as an intelligence officer with FORSCOM, XVIII Airborne Corps and the 519th MI Battalion. A foreign area officer, Peterson is an individual mobilization augmentee with USAINSCOM. His analytic experience includes military capability studies of the Middle East, Latin America, Western Europe, as well as psychological operations intelligence studies. A graduate of MIOAC, Peterson is currently completing his MA in government at Georgetown University.

SMA Morrell visits USAICS

During his August 16 visit to the Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Sergeant Major of the Army Glen E. Morrell takes time out to talk with reservists training at the Department of Surveillance and Systems Maintenance. The reservists, from the 138th MI Battalion (CEWI), Chicago Ill. were working with the AN/PPS-5 ground surveillance radar during their two weeks of annual training.

"Contrary to popular belief of what we read in the newspaper," Morrell said, "the soldiers today are ready to go to war if called upon to do the job." (photo by Sp4 Carl Keith)

Homeward Bound!

On the morning of May 31, 1984, eight C141 aircraft flew over Fort Hua-chuca to mark the beginning of field training exercise "Homeward Bound," and a bit of Intelligence Center and School history was made. Paratroops from the 313th Military Intelligence Battalion (Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence), 82nd Airborne Division, exited the aircraft following their commander, Lt. Col. Thomas W. O'Connell, and Maj. Gen. Sidney T. Wein-stein, commander of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, over Humor Drop Zone at Fort Huachuca.

"This is a historic occasion (for the Intelligence Center and School) since it represents the first time that an active Army military intelligence battalion, combat electronic warfare and intelli-gence, has returned to the home of mil-itary intelligence for a field training exer-cise," Weinstein said.

The 13-day exercise provided a chance to evaluate and test the organization and mission effectiveness of the 313th. The battalion was designed to support the Rapid Deployment Force mission and uses the Company Team Employment Concept. Another important mission of the exercise was to provide a detailed study to assist in creating a valid Army Readiness Test and Evaluation Program.

"Troops need to be commanded by their own leaders who act as liaisons between the unit being supported and the MI unit," explained O'Connell. "The Company Team Employment Concept will provide the finest intelligence to the combined arms commander."

The exercise gave USAICS' faculty and students a chance to interact with members of the battalion. After the formal FTX was completed, the battalion remained in the field, giving briefings about organization and equipment, capabilities and vulnerabilities, and to answer any questions from the students and faculty. Since the battalion had actively participated in the invasion of Grenada, many members of the battalion shared experiences with visitors. The FTX was a learning experience for the battalion as well as those assigned to USAICS; operating in the desert was a first for many of the soldiers.

"We hope that the exercise will be but the first of a series of exercises where MI battalions and groups will come out to Fort Huachuca, to the home of military intelligence, and ply their trade and exchange information with us," said Weinstein.

Prior to the mass air drop, members of the 82nd Airborne demonstrate the duties of a jump master in preparing jumpers for a safe exit from the C-141B aircraft. (photo by Ron Hill)

A sergeant from the 313th MI Battalion explains the AN/PPS-5 surveillance radar to 96B (Intelligence Analysis) students. (photo by Bob Kerr)

BOOKS CURRENTLY AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW

The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy by Robert Jervis

Operation Barbarossa: Strategy and Tactics on the Eastern Front 1941 by Bryan I. Fugate

The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente by Harry Gelman

Terror and Communist Politics: The Role of the Secret Police in Communist States, edited by Jonathan R. Adelman

Strategy and the Defense Dilemma: Nuclear Politics and Alliance Politics by Gerald Garvey

Enigma by Wladyslaw Kozaczuk

Soldiers Without Politics: Blacks in the South African Armed Forces by Kenneth W. Grundy

Two if by Sea: The Development of American Coastal Defense Policy by Robert S. Browning III

Operation ZAPATA: The Ultrasensitive Report and Testimony of the Board of Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs by Luis Aguilar

Division-Level Communications 1962-1973 by Lt. Gen. Charles R. Myer

International Regimes, edited by Stephen D. Kramer

Industrial Capacity and Defense Planning by Lee D. Olvey, Henry A. Leonard and Bruce E Arlinghaus

Defending a Free Society by Robert W. Poole Jr.

The Lion and the White Falcon: Britain and Iceland in the World War II Era by Donald F. Bittner

Political/Military Applications of Bayesian Analysis by Douglas E. Hunter

Faint Praise: American Tanks and Tank Destroyers During World War II by Charles M. Baily

Drop Zone Sicily: Allied Airborne Strike July 1943 by William B. Breuer

Prelude to Overlord by Humphrey Wynn and Susan Young

These books are currently available for review at the **Military Intelligence** office on a first-come, first-serve basis. Prospective reviewers can get more information by calling Autovon 879-3033 or commercial (602) 538-3033, or by writing Commander, USAICS, ATTN: ATSI-TD-MIM (Book Review), Fort Huachuca, Ariz. 85613-6000. Books will be sent out only with the agreement that a book review will be sent back within a reasonable amount of time. Format should be type-written, double-spaced copy with the reviewer's full name, address, and phone number (Autovon if possible). Cover information should include full title of the book, author (or editor), city and state of publication, publisher, year of publication, number of pages, and price.

Unsolicited reviews are always welcome, especially very new books on intelligence, doctrine, tactics and threat. Reviews already submitted to other publications need not be sent.

Note: **Military Intelligence** is looking for book *reviews*, not book synopses. Don't just rewrite the cover notes.

USAICS Notes

96B20 Primary Technical Course

In FY 85, the Department of Tactics, Intelligence and Military Science will offer the first of two technical courses for the 96B MOS, Intelligence Analyst. The 96B20 Primary Technical Course will provide the intelligence analyst with skill level two enhancement and eventually all source analysis training. This course will be four weeks, two days long and will be initially taught at the collateral level starting in October 1984. The analysts will receive 144 hours of training to include MI unit (CEWI) organization and capabilities, SIGINT and electronic warfare concepts and operations, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, intelligence reports and collection management/dissemination. Additionally, the course will incorporate a general skills diagnos-

tic examination at the beginning, as well as an introduction to and the use of automated data processing systems and the Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems (JINTACCS) program. The tentative FY 85 schedule for the 96B Primary Technical Course follows:

CLASS NUMBER	PERIOD
01	14 Oct - 9 Nov 84
02	6 Jan - 1 Feb 85
03	3 Feb - 4 Mar 85
04	3 Mar - 29 Mar 85
05	31 Mar - 26 Apr 85
06	28 Apr - 24 May 85
07	2 Jan - 28 Jun 85
08	30 Jun - 29 Jul 85
09	4 Aug - 30 Aug 85
10	8 Sep - 4 Oct 85

To be eligible to attend this course, the soldier must be an E5 or on the promotion list to grade E5, or an E4 or below performing in an E5 position. Soldiers may attend under a TDY enroute to a new assignment status or a TDY and return status. Under the TDY and return status the soldier's organization must fund for the training. Attendance at the PTC is authorized if the soldier has a SECRET clearance and a minimum of six months retention following course completion. Interested soldiers should submit a DA Form 4187 (Personnel Action Request) through channels to MILPERCEN.

In October 1987, DTIMS will also initiate the 96B30 Basic Technical Course which will be approximately six weeks in length and will provide the 96B with advanced training in all-source analysis. Development of POI progress will be addressed in a future edition of this magazine.

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Sea Wee?
A volunteer jumps from a helicopter into a Fort Huachuca pond as part of a "helocasting" demonstration recently sponsored by the 1st School Brigade, USAICS.

Helocasting is part of a new four-hour water survival training program at USAICS. "It allows students an opportunity for poolside learning in a true to life situation of emergency exiting techniques aboard a disabled helicopter," explained 2nd Lt. Gregory Sanborn, project officer for water survival training.

Besides being a training method for over-water emergencies, helocasting can also be used tactically during local field training exercises to simulate the insertion of intelligence personnel on reconnaissance missions. For the 25 June demonstration, five jumpers donned LPU-10 individual life support equipment and exited the helicopter with a tactical raft to perform a simulated clandestine operation. (U.S. Army Photo)

The Liberian Intelligence System

By CW2 James M. Webb

Editor's Note: A four-man Intelligence Training Team from USAICS, Fort Huachuca, Ariz., recently returned from Liberia where they assisted in the development of a functional intelligence organization for the Liberian military. Accompanying CW2 James Webb, the author of this article, were Capt. Thomas Debose, Capt. James Stenke, and MSgt. Raymond Morse. A comprehensive intelligence course, the first of its kind for the Liberians, was conducted with graduation ceremonies in February 1984. All U.S. team members were made honorary tribal chiefs, given African names and were presented ceremonial chief robes. With the assistance of the Intelligence Training Team, a viable intelligence organization and system is being developed to enhance and improve the abilities and flow of intelligence of the Armed Forces of Liberia.

The Liberian intelligence system is unique to any intelligence system in the world. The uniqueness stems from the history of Liberia, the Armed Forces of Liberia, and the intelligence organization and its functions.

Liberia was founded in the 1800s by former U.S. slaves who first tried to land in Sierra Leone but were repulsed and proceeded down the coast to form present day Liberia. The flag of Liberia resembles the flag of the United States except that it has one large star instead of fifty. The primary language of Liberia is English, but with twenty odd tribes—each with its own dialect—there are actually a variety of languages spoken. The present government is headed by Samual K. Doe, who, after a successful coup in 1980, ousted President Tolbert. The country is currently run by the military.

Liberia is surrounded by militarily stronger neighbors. Two of Liberia's neighbors are being assisted by communist militaries, namely, Sierra Leone by the Cubans and Guinea by the Soviet Union. Liberia has cordial relations with the Ivory Coast, but

CW2 James M. Webb becomes a "chief" of a different kind in a Liberian ceremony. Webb, known in Liberian intelligence circles as "Kpa Ku Tanga," was one of a four-man team who assisted the Liberians with their intelligence system and organization.

there are underlying tensions. This is partly due to the fact that the president of the Ivory Coast's son-in-law disappeared in Liberia during the 1980 coup. Also, in 1983, a coup attempt was made to replace Doe with General Quiompka. This has caused internal problems that can be felt to this day.

In April 1985, President Doe is to allow free elections in Liberia. This could be a volatile situation if not conducted properly. Although Liberia has never been the colony of a superpower and has never suffered the anguish of being made subservient, its growth has been beseiged with many problems, primarily racism and tribal affiliation.

When Doe's coup was successful, it changed the scene of AFL intelligence. One added function was helping Doe establish an intracountry powerbase of knowledge to help sus-

tain his position. Presently, this is the primary mission of AFL intelligence.

The Liberian intelligence community is basically divided into three organizations: the National Security Agency, the G2 and the Brigade S2. The NSA is supposed to be an external intelligence gathering organization, but is used primarily for internal use as an internal intelligence gathering tool, while the Brigade S2 is used for external intelligence and combat tactical intelligence.

The NSA and G2 usually work as one function while the Minister of Defense and the Brigade S2 serve as another. Liberia, as mentioned earlier, is divided by tribal factions. Tribal loyalties transcend even Liberian loyalties. Doe uses this knowledge to maintain the intelligence community ineptitude in certain areas and strength in others. For example, the Ministry of Defense, the Brigade S2

and the battalion S2s are a mixture of tribes, while the NSA and the G2 are mainly from one (Doe's) tribe.

Doe does not fear any external aggression, except from General Quiompka, who is presently in the Ivory Coast. The NSA and the G2 are rendering a great effort towards bringing Quiompka to justice. Internal intelligence receives a high priority from Doe since he fears another coup against himself. The NSA and G2 receive the largest quantity and greatest quality of finances and equipment. Doe uses infiltration on all levels of intelligence to report on each other. This system of checks and balances ensures that no one is building a power base.

The NSA is is used as a security force to protect Doe. Besides presidential security, they are used to spy and report on individuals within the Doe hierarchy. Some agents have dual roles as G2 personnel.

The G2 is divided into two main sections: administrative and operations. The operations section is the workhorse of AFL intelligence. Operations is subdivided into interrogation, agent, order of battle and liaison branches. G2 personnel have judicial jurisdiction over the Liberian people. The interrogators are involved in civil, criminal, military and espionage related interrogations. The G2 section is not similar to the G2 of the U.S. Army, but is primarily responsible for assisting in the uncovering of internal plots and assisting in criminal cases.

The Brigade S2's primary function is to report on external aggression and to patrol the borders. The Brigade S2 receives the least amount of finances and resources.

Presently, the AFL intelligence organizations are lacking a consistent flow of information. There are currently no files being maintained with cross references for analytical purposes. Information is being compartmented in different agencies. There is also no classification system for the limited amount of information being maintained. Tribal affiliation is being encouraged which gives an individual a "need to know." This will be a difficult problem to overcome.

USAISD Notes

USAISD Pensacola Detachment

What is an Army detachment doing at a Naval base? In the case of the Pensacola Detachment of the U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens, the answer is "a good job." The Pensacola Detachment carries on a proud tradition of excellence in training and professional development of soldier/technicians within an executive agent training environment at the Naval Technical Training Center, Corry Station, Pensacola, Fla.

The Army first established a detachment at Corry in 1967 when the U.S. Army Security Agency Training Center and School, Fort Devens, Mass., as it was known then, opened a liaison office supporting an annual Army student input of eight personnel attending the Advanced Non-Morse Collector/Analysis Course. In a decision commonly known as executive agent training, DoD decided to consolidate common training to reduce the need for the services' triplication of instructors, equipment, and facilities required for training certain cryptologic MOSs and skills. The Navy was selected as executive agent for non-Morse training for all services.

Implementation of DoD's decision resulted in a increase in the Army's Pensacola Detachment to 30 personnel and an annual student load of over 200.

In 1976 the Department of the Army decided to place all training under one command. Intelligence training was consolidated under the Intelligence Center and School, headquartered at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., and subordinate to TRADOC. The school at Fort Devens, Mass., was redesignated as the U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens, thus establishing campuses for intelligence training at Huachuca, Devens, Goodfellow Air Force Base and Pensacola—all divided by distance but united in mission.

Today the Pensacola Detachment has 63 staff and instructors and an annual student load of over 250. Its mission is to train intelligence soldiers in non-Morse skills; provide senior NCO additional skill identifier training for non-Morse; serve as the Army's daily working level point of contact and coordinator for executive agent training matters related to non-Morse; and provide command, control, Uni-

Graves Hall at the AIS Pensacola Detachment.

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form Code of Military Justice, administrative and logistic support, and nontechnical training to all soldiers assigned or attached to the detachment.

The unit is organized with command, support and instructor/liaison sections, and provides support to the executive agent training decision, ensuring the training of the Army's non-Morse intercept operator, MOS 05K. Training conducted in this tri-service environment provides soldiers with their advanced individual training. The courses provided are the non-Morse preparatory course, providing instruction in International Morse Code, and an introduction to basic signal theory to include receivers, demodulators, and radio printers. This course prepares students for the Technical Extracts of Binary Operations Course (AN/GSQ-76). Their knowledge of signal theory is expanded and they learn to operate analog tape recorders, sonographs, teletype terminals, and the over TEBO system. Upon completion of the six-month course, students are awarded MOS 05K and depart to duty assignments in Europe, the Far East, and the United States. In addition to the AIT courses, there are seven skill identifier courses, two of which are maintenance courses for senior personnel relating to mission requirements at the various INSCOM field stations. Also, a number of soldiers continue their training at the Intelligence School, Fort Devens, before assignment to permanent duty stations.

The slogan "Army—Be All You Can Be" sets the tone and emphasis for the soldierization training provided by the Pensacola NCOs. This important part of soldier development is not part of the school curriculum but rather of the daily routine. Daily formations and inspections ensure the proper wear of the uniform, individual accountability, military conduct and marching in formation. Tough physical training and weight control programs ensure physically fit soldiers.

A common skills sustainment program incorporates the tasks contained in the soldiers manuals, both common task and MOS. This program includes weapons training, threat vehicle identification, first aid, land navigation, map reading, and nuclear, biological and chemical warfare operations. The soldier is given every opportunity to excel and to receive credit for his or her accomplishments. Outstanding soldiers with good academic records are selected for ASI courses as part of the Intensified Management Program. Those excelling in the academic environment, as well as setting maximum standards on physical training and soldierization skills, are considered for the Army Achievement Medal under the STRAC program developed at USA-ISD. (See related article in this issue.)

Named after Medal of Honor recipient, Navy Lt. Cmdr. William M. Corry Jr., Corry Station was founded in 1923 on a remote site north of Pensacola. It relocated in 1928 after Escambia County presented the Federal Government with the current 530-acre site. Corry Station progressed from an active aviation training command to that of a Naval Auxiliary Air Station during the postwar years and eventual decommissioning in 1958.

Realizing the need for growth and the complexity of training requirements, the Navy relocated its school for communications technicians to Corry in 1961. It was then that the Naval Communications Training Center began operation, and with the addition of school disciplines of photography and electronic warfare, as well as executive agent for non-Morse training, it was renamed the Naval Technical Training Center.

Life at Corry offers soldiers a unique advantage of having the opportunity to learn, train, and compete with members of like rank from all services. Camaraderie and unit esprit de corps are evident not only within the school environment but also throughout the year-round sports program.

The base facilities available to the Pensacola soldiers cover a wide variety of things to do during off-duty hours. Facilities include a theater, bowling alley, gym, library, recreational building, auto hobby shop, and an award winning service club. A large exchange shopping complex with a newly opened commissary adjacent to Corry Station.

Pensacola and the surrounding area offer a variety of opportunities to those assigned. A temperate climate, beautiful beaches, golf courses, historic forts, and numerous annual festivals—all make this an ideal location for training. It is a place where the soldier can live up to the detachment motto—

"Where the Best
Lead
the Rest"

Pensacola Detachment
students copy Morse code.

SKILL, TOUGH, READY AROUND THE CLOCK (STRAC)

By Richard D. Lussier

Perhaps one of the most significant transitions experienced by a young soldier is the transition from the basic combat training environment to the advanced individual training environment. During basic combat training, emphasis is necessarily placed on physical conditioning and the acquisition of soldiering skills.

The advanced individual training phase presents a formidable challenge to both trainer and trainee. Not only must previously aquired soldiering skills and physical fitness be maintained, but soldiers must be equipped with the skills necessary to perform in an MOS upon arrival at the first unit of assignment.

To assist the soldier in this major transition, a program referred to as "STRAC" has been developed and implemented by the 1st Battalion, 2nd School Brigade, U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens.

The program was devised to inspire initiative and spirit into the many students trained by the battalion.

Essentially, the program provides incentives for the achievement and maintenance of both academic and soldierly excellence.

Advanced individual training is basically structured on a "go/no go" standard.

With a program such as "STRAC" incorporated into AIT, "outstanding" becomes an added dimension to the training standard.

"STRAC," simply stated, is a tool designed to provide the soldier with the incentive for outstanding performance in the AIT setting.

Each component of the program is designed to assist the soldier in developing certain abilities: "S" designates a skill accomplishment, "T" indicates tough, and "RAC" recognizes the "ready around the clock" elements.

During inprocessing, soldiers receive an orientation of the "STRAC" program. Each soldier is provided with a pocket reference which outlines the objectives.

Academic requirements (or the "S" component of "STRAC") are explained for each MOS on the students' first day of class.

Requirements are correlated to the difficulty of the academic requirements for each MOS; with each branch of USAISD having different requirements based on the particular MOS involved.

Further details concerning the "tough" and "ready around the clock" components of the "STRAC" program are provided by the company cadre as training progresses.

The achievement and maintenance of the "skill" requirement — superior academic standards — are established by the academic element.

To receive the initial "S" or skill award, a student must maintain a prescribed grade average. A second standard may be prescribed by the department. Students receiving the skill award are officially recognized for their achievement in a classroom award ceremony during which they are presented the award by the school's chief instructor.

Additionally, the student may receive a three-day pass, or be granted excused absence during other phases of the class.

The standard for the award of the "T" or "tough" component of "STRAC" requires attainment of the maximum score on the monthly PT test.

The soldiers take part in daily PT. They also must pass a physical readiness training test every month during AIT. To keep the "tough" award a soldier must max the PT test each month.

Students who attain the maximum score on the monthly PT test are recognized for their achievement during a semimonthly battalion PT formation. The "tough" component of "STRAC" is good exercise. The confidence it builds in the soldier — through not only meeting but surpassing the Army's requirements — is the key to its success.

The standard for award of the "RAC" or "ready around the clock" award requires that a soldier consistently demonstrate knowledge of, and compliance with, company policy.

The service member must routinely maintain superior standards of personal appearance, be proficient in soldierly skills and demonstrate the ability to perform the MOS in a field environment.

The "RAC" award is presented to the recipient by the platoon sergeant during a company formation.

The key to the success for a program such as "STRAC" relies principally on two factors:

First, the effort must be well orchestrated. Each member of the cadre, staff and faculty involved with "STRAC" must emphasize its importance in the contact with the soldier/student.

Second, recognition for outstanding performance must be timely and meaningful.

The program is especially workable because each element of "STRAC" contains unique appeal. For instance, students who are inclined toward academic achievement are more apt to try for the "skill" component first.

The service school's effort in the development of skilled, physically fit and motivated soldiers is one that

Air insertion is a part of the FTX experience for soldierization training.

requires all of its elements working in concert.

Academic and soldierly aspects of service school life must be balanced. Emphasis on one or the other must be shared, as appropriate.

A program such as "STRAC" is a valuable tool in the achievement of the service school's ultimate goal— that of providing the Army with the best trained soldier possible.

Richard D. Lussier is an education technician in the Curriculum Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, at USAISD.

Field training is year-round. Here students undergo a winter FTX.

Officers' Notes

Warrant Officer Accession Board

By CW3 Thomas W. Green

I recently represented the military intelligence branch at the December 1983 DA MILPERCEN Warrant Officer Accession Board. The purpose of this board is to review the records of individuals applying for appointment as warrant officers, and to recommend individuals for appointment as warrant officers. The board does not select the individuals who will actually be appointed; that job is left to the Warrant Officer Accession Branch at MILPERCEN. The appointments are based on the requirements of the Army, and individuals are appointed based on their order of merit as determined by the Warrant Officer Accession Board.

The board consists of 10 commissioned and warrant officers, including minority representation. The president of this board was a colonel; other personnel included three majors, two captains and four warrant officers, plus a non-voting secretary/recorder.

For the first time, some of the proponent schools were offered the opportunity to send one representative each to sit on the board to represent the interest of the proponent branches. On this particular board, the intelligence, signal, quartermaster and ordnance schools sent representatives—warrant officers in grades CW3 or CW4.

The board consisted of 10 people, with five members actually reviewing and voting on any single application. The board members represented a wide variety of military skills and backgrounds. Each member began the selection process with 30 to 40 records to review and vote on. After the initial review and vote by the first board member, the packet was routed by the secretary/recorder to four other members for further review and voting.

The board was given a word picture, which evolved out of the review and voting process, of potential appointees. (Figure 1 is an example of the word picture used by the board.) Scores range from 1 to 6; decimal increments of .3, .5, and .7 could be used to further qualify individuals. A score of 6 indicates that the individual is fully qualified, and should be promoted without hesitation. Some of the documents screened to determine qualifications are assignment history, evaluation reports, military and civilian education, technical experience, record of Article 15s or courts martial proceedings, and the applicant's resume'.

DA Circular 601-83-2, Warrant Officer Procurement Program-FY 84, was used as a reference to check mandatory and preferred prerequisites for each MOS. In many cases the standards can be met by either formal training or practical experience.

Only after the board member has decided on a score would he or she turn the packet over and see how the other panel members voted. The scores would be recorded on the voting record attached to each packet, along with any comments. If there was a wide variance between scores, the packet would be reviewed again to see if anything had been overlooked.

In this manner, records could be double checked to ensure that all members voting had seen and considered the same items. It is possible when reviewing records to overlook an item which might have a significant bearing on the suitability of an individual. However, it must be emphasized that each individual board member votes his or her own conscience, regardless of what other members vote.

Individuals submitting applications for appointment to warrant officer should consider the following items and their importance in the scoring process:

Figure 1

VOTE	DESCRIPTION
6	Outstanding Applicant: - Strong in all evaluated areas - Select over all other applicants
5	Excellent Applicant: - Good in all evaluated areas - Strong in some evaluated areas - Select without hesitation
4	Average Applicant: - Good in all evaluated areas - Select within order of merit
3	Marginal Applicant: - Weak in some evaluated areas - Should not be selected now
2	Weak Applicant: - Weak in most evaluated areas - Should not be selected
1	DO NOT SELECT: - Significant deficiencies in evaluated areas

Incremental values of .3, .5, and .7 may also be used to score applicants between the whole number values of 1 thru 6.

• **DA Form 61 (Application for Appointment).** This application must be filled out completely and accurately. This is especially true for the section which asks if you have ever been charged under Article 15, courts martial, or civilian court proceedings. If this section is marked "no," and a record of proceedings or punishment is found in the microfiche during the board proceedings, the fact that there is a discrepancy between the application and the microfiche will be taken into account. The degree to which the discrepancy will affect the application is a subjective matter, and is decided by each board member individually. The fact that an individual received an Article 15 or similar action early in his or her career, especially if it was for a relatively minor act, and if the individual's record has been clean since that time, is not normally a significant factor.

• **Resume'.** This is a very important part of the application. It is important that the resume' be neat and understandable. Spelling, punctuation and grammar are very important. A poorly written resume' creates a poor first impression. Make sure that the description of duties performed is as accurate and informative as possible, and that leadership responsibilities are clearly explained and defined. Any special recognition received should be mentioned. Try to avoid technical terms or terms which are not commonly used outside of a particular MOS or CMF. If the board does not understand the terminology they cannot make an accurate assessment of the qualifications and experience listed. Be sure to list all pertinent education, both military and civilian, which applies to the desired MOS. Keep in mind that many courses completed may not have a direct technical impact on the qualifications for appointment, but will show a broader education/experience base. Also keep in mind, that if you don't have the preferred schooling required for appointment as a warrant officer in the MOS, as indicated in the appropriate procurement circular, your resume' should show that you have had practical experience which compensates for that lack of training.

• **Mandatory and Preferred Prerequisites.** Read Circular 601-83-2 (or whatever procurement circular is current at the time), and make sure that you meet at least the mandatory prerequisites. If you do not meet those prerequisites,

you are ineligible to apply. Ideally, you should meet the preferred prerequisites also. Make sure that your resume' identifies the courses which you have attended which are listed as mandatory prerequisites and those which are listed as preferred prerequisites. Again, if you have practical experience which compensates for the lack of preferred prerequisites or formal training, make sure that fact is clearly indicated in your resume'.

• **Assignments.** A mixture of tactical and strategic, overseas and CONUS assignments is beneficial. Board members recognize that a perfect mix of assignments is almost never seen. However, applicants with a more diverse range of assignments will normally be more favorably considered. If assignments should also include instructor, or school or staff assignments, so much the better. The bottom line is that the board members are looking for the most highly qualified applicants. A highly qualified applicant is assumed to have a diverse assignment pattern, rather than spending an entire career at one location. In addition to diverse assignment patterns, individuals must have demonstrated the ability to perform all aspects of the job with a high degree of success.

• **Enlisted Evaluation Report.** Make sure that the description of duties is accurate on the EER, as it is read very closely when the board is reviewing your application. Make sure that the EER is neat and that there are no typographical errors on it before you sign. A sloppy EER, if it says good things about an individual will not disqualify you for appointment, but the fact that you do not take pride in the proper preparation of your EER will be taken into account. Again, make sure that the terminology used in the EER is understandable. Terminology which is unique to a specific MOS or CMF may leave board members confused about what it was that you were actually doing. If you feel that the wording in an EER should be changed, request that the rater or endorser make the changes before you sign it; after all, the EER is going to affect your career, one way or another.

• **Letters of Recommendation or Commendation.** At the present time, letters of recommendation and commendation are not authorized for inclusion in the application packet. Letters of commendation which are

included with a packet are redundant as those letters will be part of the individual's official microfiche. Letters of recommendation, if authorized for inclusion in the packet, are most valuable if they are written by a warrant officer currently holding the same MOS as that for which the individual is applying, and they should be as current as possible. Letters of recommendation from generals and other high ranking officers which do not say anything specific about the technical qualifications of the individual will not carry very much weight with the board. Numbers do not necessarily impress the board. It is the content of the letters and the knowledge of the individual writing the letter that are most important.

• **Official Photograph.** Make sure that your official photograph is current and that you are wearing all authorized decorations. For those individuals who are not yet required to have an official photograph in their microfiche, the same rules apply as if you were going to have an official photograph taken.

The bottom line to submitting an application for appointment to warrant officer is that the Army wants the most highly qualified individuals possible. This means that an applicant should ensure that the application presents the best possible picture of the individual, both word picture and official photograph. Make sure that the resume' shows all pertinent information, and is neatly prepared. Remember that the resume' represents you. For potential applicants, do the best you can to ensure that you attend as many MOS-related courses as possible; make every attempt to attend Primary Leadership Course or an NCO Academy, or similar training when you have the opportunity. Also, try to vary your assignments, getting the best mix that you can between tactical and strategic assignments, and between overseas and CONUS. If you have an opportunity to be an instructor or get some other type of school/staff assignment, and you do a good job, it is not going to hurt you. Remember, the Army is looking for a few good individuals with experience and potential to appoint as warrant officers.

Applicants for Military Intelligence Warrant Officer MOS (with the exception of MOS 973A) must submit a request for a Special Background

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Investigation through their respective security manager or office to the Personnel Investigations Control Center, Defense Investigative Service, upon notification that they have been selected for appointment by the MILPERCEN Warrant Officer Accession Branch. It is highly recommended that the required SBI packets be prepared as part of the application process, so that the SBI packet is ready to submit upon official notification of selection for appointment. SBI packets must not be forwarded to DIS until official notification has been received. Applicants who are already cleared and indoctrinated should check with their respective security manager or office to determine the status of their clearance, and whether or not they will be required to submit the required paperwork for an SBI-Bring Up investigation, if selected for appointment. Again, the Bring-Up packet should not be forwarded to DIS until official notification of selection for appointment has been received from MILPERCEN, unless the respective security division requires that it be submitted for a normal reinvestigation.

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CW3 Thomas W. Green is currently serving as the chief of the Technical Control and Analysis Section of the newly formed Training Support Company (CEWI). He enlisted in the Army in October 1960, was appointed to WO1 from E7 in July 1972, and promoted to present grade in November 1979. Green received an AA degree in 1974 from New York Regents. He has attended the Morse Code Intercept Operator Course, Electronic Maintenance Course, Spanish Language School, and Warrant Officer Advanced and Senior courses. He also has served as an instructor at Fort Devens, and here at Fort Huachuca.

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Leadership and BTMS

By Captain Robert B. Adolph Jr.

No burden is greater than the mantle of leadership. No job is more important, and no responsibility greater than that of the leader. It is the role that we as officers fulfill in the military. The "why" of leadership is self evident. The larger question is always "how." How do we as leaders best support our superiors, develop ourselves, and train our subordinates? This is the single greatest challenge of our respective careers.

No topic of O-club barroom conversation is more discussed and at the same time less understood. We speak of setting the example, checking the checkers, maintaining standards, and often complain about the inadequacies of the NCO corps. It is worthwhile to take pause and review for ourselves where we as individuals and leaders hope to go. Military intelligence is full of specialists. We have analysts, linguists, interrogators, and agents—all trained (at the entry level) and hopefully dedicated. MI officers, in particular, suffer from the anathema of specialization. It is not uncommon for us to lose sight of our role as leaders, while enmeshed in our specialized duties.

As officers in military intelligence it is incumbent upon us to train our subordinates. Most of us to varying degrees have other officers, NCOs and enlisted soldiers in our charge. They look to us as role models, and expect their leadership to be intelli-

> **"Leadership is an intangible. No weapon, no impersonal piece of machinery ever designed can take its place.".**
> **—Omar N. Bradley**

gent, reasonable, and caring. Are we living up to their expectations?

Maj. Gen. Sidney T. Weinstein, Commander of the Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., closes his correspondence with the words, "Take care of the soldiers." Obviously "caring" is very important to him, as it should be to us. One way to demonstrate caring is through training. Well trained soldiers are disciplined, challenged, and dedicated because their leadership places emphasis on their training and, in so doing, demonstrates the caring of which Weinstein speaks.

There are many tools available to us to train our soldiers. One of these is the battalion training management system. But BTMS is not only for the battalion commander; if used correctly, it is of value to all of us. At first glance, it would appear that BTMS is solely the problem of commanders and S3s, but nothing could be further from the truth.

This article is not intended to review the objectives and principles of BTMS.

By now all the "buzz-words" of the system are well entrenched in our minds. Instead, this is an attempt to discuss issues involving training that comes up in our daily working relationships with both superiors and subordinates.

In a tactical environment we are served a daily menu of conflicting priorities. G2, battalion, staff, group, and company all seem to have objectives which often collide on a fairly regular basis. At the bottom of this organized confusion is always the soldier, who is a good deal smarter than most of us are willing to give credit for. Soldier training somehow ends up (often unintentionally) a last priority. We convince ourselves that our superior's staff study, a suspense on a report to higher headquarters, or our own personal organizational goals are somehow more important than SP4 Smith's ability to PMCS his 1/4 ton truck, or to properly maintain his weapon. After all, we tell ourselves, we are at peace, and my OER depends on other factors.

As a general rule, we devote one Wednesday afternoon a week to SQT, collective, and maintenance training. The officers who attend are usually few in number, if any at all. The soldier says to himself "If my officer doesn't think it's important, then why should it be important to me?" It is a valid question and an understandable reaction. Sometimes I feel that we as

officers don't fully grasp just how important we are to our subordinates. It is a truism that what we do is far more important than what we say. Being with our soldiers during training and helping them with that training makes a much greater statement than asking them "how it went" when they return from training.

Decentralization is a key principle of BMTS. In short, it means that you as section leaders or staff officers can and should develop your own training plans, primarily implemented by NCOs. Remember that it is our responsibility to train, task, and challenge our NCOs, who, in turn, train our soldiers. But, that statement does not imply that direct involvement by an officer is not important. Officer involvement in training is always important. Despite the smoke screens many of us have developed over the years, some of us are afraid to get involved in soldier training because we don't know the topics ourselves. However, we must not allow this to keep us from getting involved. Nothing makes soldiers happier than to have the opportunity to teach their officers something. Allow your subordinates to teach you, even as you train them. It is a mutually satisfactory arrangement which benefits both the leader and the subordinate.

Cross training is necessary in any military unit and yet it is often a very low priority. We all like to think of ourselves as important but we must train our subordinates to get along without us, and to perform functions which they have little or no training for, and many times against their desires. Remember that the best sections, staffs, and units are those that can continue to operate effectively even if the leader is absent. That's what training and cross training is all about. If you think that it is sometimes difficult to operate efficiently when one of your soldiers is on leave, another is on sick-call, and still another is pulling a company detail, imagine a situation where bullets are flying and soldiers are wounded or dying, then multiply by a factor of 10. What we face on a day to day basis now is nothing in comparison to the rigors of performing under the stress of combat, and that is what we have to prepare our soldiers for, and as we prepare ourselves. How well we train them and ourselves will be counted in

lives saved or lost in the next conflict. This is a responsibility unlike any other on the face of this earth. It is my belief that this is what officers are all about.

Performance-oriented training is the backbone of BTMS. Task, condition, and standard are familiar to all of us. The operative word is, of course, "performance." The soldier must be able to do the task; there is no replacement for hands-on training. We collectively must ensure that our training is performance oriented. That means that no training should be conducted without a test, and the test should be the actual performance of the task. This can and should be done by you and your NCOs and can be accomplished anytime, not just on Wednesday afternoons. Next time you're in the motorpool, ask one of your soldiers to demonstrate how a PMCS is performed while you and your NCO observe. If the soldier performs the PMCS satisfactorily all is well, if not, additional training is required by the NCO. This kind of performance-oriented training can be accomplished any time of the day. Test your subordinates often. Select different tasks from the soldiers' and SQT manuals, then task your NCOs. Use job books to keep track of the results of testing.

I have often heard these words from staff officers, "That's company training." To me that means that training is the company commander's problem, and so it is. The IG will inspect company training records, not staff training records. This common attitude does not take full stack of the soldier. This is particularly true of the staff soldier who finds himself once a week fulfilling obligatory training "for the commander." In order to turn this festering attitude around it is necessary for staffs to be involved, and to care about the training their soldiers are involved in. There is no replacement for being there. We must check to see that our soldiers' training is performance oriented, that we know our soldiers' weaknesses as well as their strengths, and that we take a personal interest in their training development. Commanders cannot do it on their own. All commanders need the help that every officer in their battalions can provide.

We all are very busy people. But, I put it to you without fear of contradic-

tion that nothing we do is more important than our soldiers' training. Without them we are without purpose. We must make the time to serve our soldiers. They need us as much as we need them. On the first page of a booklet written by attendees at the Army War College in 1980, I found these words, "Devote special attention to innovations such as the Battalion Training Management System." The senior officers that wrote this booklet had all commanded battalions. They learned through experience just how important BTMS can be.

Performance-oriented training leads to another desired goal—standardization. All our soldiers can be tested at one standard, so that what a soldier knows how to do in Europe, he or she also knows how to do in Hawaii. Again, the soldiers manual and SQT manual are the key ingredients. ARTEP manuals provide the standard events for much of our collective training. We as officers must become familiar with the contents of these manuals for our own development as well as the development of our subordinates. This is one way to "take care of the soldiers."

Many of these objectives require extra time and effort. These goals cannot easily be accomplished by officers possessed of an 8 to 5 working mentality. Planning training takes time. There is no substitute for an officer's dedication to soldier training. If you are committed to these goals so will your NCOs be committed.

Soldiers should be provided the opportunity during duty time to attend SQT training. One Wednesday afternoon a month is generally allotted for this. Don't simply allow your soldiers to attend; insist that they attend, and then follow-up. Inspect the training and, thereby, demonstrate your interest in your subordinates' professional development. They will appreciate it more than you know. Get involved, then stay involved. This involvement does not undercut the authority of your NCOs. Instead, if done correctly, it can serve to reinforce the role of the NCO in your organization.

Finally, nothing can take the place of honest concern for the training of your soldiers. This, of course, means correcting deficiencies as well as applauding successes. We as officers

are not perfect engines; we suffer from the same human frailties as our subordinates, and our superiors. We must, nonetheless, strive to overcome the institutional road blocks to the implementation of innovative, interesting, and quality training. Any senior officer worth his salt will allow you the time if you ask for it!

Training is every officer's responsibility. ★

Capt. Robert B. Adolf Jr. currently commands Headquarters and Service Company, 302d MI Battalion. Adolph wrote "Special Forces: A Strategic Asset" for the January-March 1982 issue of Military Intelligence. His military education includes the tactical intelligence, strategic intelligence and counterintelligence officer basic courses; Airborne, Ranger, SCUBA, jumpmaster Special Forces, Russian and Arabic Schools and the MI Officers Advanced Course.

Enlisted Notes

Not As Tough As You Think

Many soldiers mistakenly believe that it is very hard to qualify and apply for language training at the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center.

The first thing you should "think out" is that qualification in a particular foreign language can have a great deal to do with future assignments for you throughout your military career. Your primary Military Occupational Specialty qualifications coupled with your linguistic ability in a foreign language may qualify you for assignments you could not have been selected for previously.

The first step you should take is to research Department of the Army Circulars in the 350 series (Language Training For Enlisted Personnel) as they contain information concerning class start/end dates, MOS, grade, and programmed unit of assignment. This DA Circular is updated annually and reflects detailed information for the next fiscal year.

Having done this, your next course of action should be to see your Personnel Staff Noncommissioned Officer (PSNCO) for help with initiating your application. You and your PSNCO should research Chapter 4 of Army Regulation 611-6 to ensure that you meet the basic requirements for acceptance in the program. Carefully review each requirement and don't be discouraged.

If you are really interested in pursuing this career enhancing decision, then submit a DA Form 4187 to:

DA MILPERCEN
ATTN: DAPC-EPK-1
2461 Eisenhower Ave.
Alexandria, VA 22331

Your request must include an updated DA Form 2A and 2-1 and verification of Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) score. (MILPERCEN release)

CMF 33 Update

Crossword solution

Alexandria, Va.—Enlisted soldiers in career management field 33 are scheduled to receive one of six new military occupational specialties in March 1985, according to officials at the Army's Military Personnel Center.

When the restructuring is complete, CMF 33 will have evolved from its current single specialty into six MOSs:
• 33M—Electronic Warfare/Interceptor Strategic System Analyst and Command and Control Subsystem Repairer.
• 33P—EW/Intercept Strategic Receiving Subsystem Repairer.
• 33Q—EW/Intercept Strategic Signal Processing/Storage Subsystem Repairer.
• 33R—EW/Intercept Aviation System Repairer.
• 33T—EW/Intercept Tactical System Repairer.

• 33Z—EW/Intercept Systems Maintenance Supervisor (an E8/E9 "capper MOS").

An Army letter of notification (LON E-2-11) announcing the approved restructure was mailed to major Army commands and Army staff agencies in January 1984. The letter discussed the nature of and reasons for the change and indicated that revised portions of AR 611-201 will contain specific data about the new specialties. Also included were reclassification guidance that applies to all MOS 33S positions; approved paragraph and line number position coding changes to the new MOS for units with approved MOS 33S positions; and other information to make early planning more efficient.

Change 2 to AR 611-201 is being printed and should be in the field by

June 1984, the authors said.

This advanced distribution permits commanders and soldiers to review the restructure plan and learn how it will affect them, officials said.

Other items of interest to commanders and soldiers affected by the new structure are:

• During April 1984, MILPERCEN sent a letter to every soldier in CMF 33. The letter described the restructuring and provided guidance on how to prepare individual records for the reclassification action.

From July through October 1984, local military personnel offices will send personnel packets for all soldiers in CMF 33 to the Military Police/ Military Intelligence Branch of the Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate (DAPC-EPL-M) at MILPERCEN.

In October 1984, MILPERCEN officials will compare information from major commands with authorization documents containing CMF 33 positions. This will verify the accuracy of other documentation.

A board at MILPERCEN including the career management field proponent meets in December 1984 to reclassify soldiers into the new specialties based on needs of the Army, their training, experience, and individual preference.

In February 1985, MILPERCEN officials will send letters of instruction to local MILPOs directing the award of new MOSs.

Then, in March 1985, all MOS 33S personnel will be awarded a new primary specialty of 33M, 33P, 33Q, 33R, 33T, or 33Z. Soldiers may also receive a new secondary or additional MOS based on their training or experience.

Officials said the ultimate success of the restructure and reclassification action depends on support and cooperation by field commanders. A major problem during similar actions in the past has been the process of regrading positions by applying revised standards of grade.

Proponency Notes

New PDP on Soviet Air Forces

During FY 83, the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center developed a language training program for the linguist who is concerned with the Soviet air forces. The entire course contains 17 lessons addressing the Russian language from the viewpoint of airfield operations, aircraft servicing, Soviet air forces organization, aircraft tactics, etc. Two lessons have been completed, and their respective cassette tapes have been recorded. These two lessons are currently being validated. More information about this new Professional Development Program extension course will follow. The courses will be available in FY 85.

New Headstart Courses

The video versions of the German and Latin American (Spanish) Headstart programs were distributed in early 1984. Korean, Italian and Tagalog video Headstarts should be available in September 1984. Funding for other Headstart courses is being sought from users. Advise your command channels of your requirements.

Soviet Ground Forces Course Changes

The Russian Professional Developmental Program extension course, Soviet Ground Forces, has been reconfigured and is being republished. The course consists of three subcourses: Soviet Motorized Rifle Troops, Soviet Tank Troops, and Soviet Artillery Troops. These subcourses were initially completed in 1981, and were published in the Army Training Extension Course format. The new subcourses contain original lessons reprinted as Professional Development Program courses. The cassette tapes which accompany the lessons have been "revoiced" to conform to the changes. This procedure has reduced the number of tapes by approximately 50 percent, while retaining the same number of learning exercises. Additionally, the Ground Forces Glossary has been expanded to include the vocabulary terms from all three subcourses, and the book has been printed in a smaller size (5 X 8 inches) for easier handling.

Defense Language Proficiency Test III Information

Since the introduction of the Defense Language Proficiency Test III, there has been some confusion about the differences between it and the old version, such as the DLPT I/II. Some major differences are:

• The DLPT I/II measures listening and reading comprehension only. The DLPT measures those skills, plus speaking.

• The total administration time for the DLPT I/II was two hours. The total administration time for the DLPT III is five and a half hours.

• The speaking part of the DLPT III requires the examinee to record responses on a blank tape. This test can be administered either in an individual or group mode in a lab where separate booths and a console should be provided. The time required is approximately one hour.

• The Russian and Korean DLPT III will be available in the near future through normal channels. Other languages will follow. As soon as a DLPT III in a specific language is available for administration, its DLPT I/II counterpart should be destroyed.

PROFESSIONAL READER

The Shadow Network, Espionage as an Instrument of Soviet Policy
by Edward Van Der Rhoer, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, January 1984, 374 pages.

The Shadow Network by Edward Van Der Rhoer is a very glib attempt to show the worldwide impact the Soviet KGB has had since the Cheka first began to operate in Soviet Russia after the October 1917 Revolution. The Cheka was initially setup by Lenin during the "military phase" of the Bolshevik Revolution to protect the new Soviet government from both its internal and external enemies. The author does not purport his book to be a complete history of Soviet espionage, but instead emphasizes highlights of the most well-known cases of Soviet spies and defectors from the Soviet Intelligence Service, with some of their unique problems and experiences.

I think that this book's most poignant message is that up until Beria's execution, after the death of Stalin in 1953, the head of Soviet State Security usual method of leaving that position was to be slain by that very communist system that these heads of the Soviet State Security structure murdered or imprisoned thousands of Russians to protect. The book also goes into sizable detail on what happens to well known Soviet espionage agents apprehended by Western counterintelligence agencies, their exchange for Western agents caught in the Soviet Union (the Abel-Powers exchange is an example used in the book), how they are treated upon their return to the Soviet Union, and in some notable cases, their ultimate fate.

The main shortcoming in Mr. Rhoer's book is that this book is a montage of information extracted from a vast Soviet and Western open source data base. Another feature that I felt would make this book a better product would be photographs from the principal cases that he cited in this book. I think that this added feature would have assisted newly interested readers on the subject of Soviet espionage, when the old adage, would truly have been "one picture is worth a thousand words."

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The Papers of George Catlett Marshall: The Soldierly Spirit, December 1880–June 1939, Edited by Larry I. Bland, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Md., $30.00.

George C. Marshall is one of the premier American military figures of the 20th Century. He became renowned for his ability as a staff officer during his World War I service with the American Expeditionary Force and General Pershing's operations staff. In the interwar years, he became well-known througout the Army as a tactician, troop leader, and military educator. As the Assistant Commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, from 1927 to 1932, he oversaw the preparation of no fewer than 160 future generals, many of whom he personally would pick for key commands in the midst of World War II.

While Chief of Staff during that war, Marshall was one of the principle U.S. and Allied strategists; his contributions as an organizer and manager of the war effort would be hard to over-emphasize. And as if this military career full of accomplishments were not enough, Marshall went on to become Secretary of State during the early Cold War period, and won the Nobel Peace Prize for the highly successful economic recovery plan for Western Europe which bears his name.

Although Marshall's military career was filled with personal successes, it also held some fascinating ironies which well reflect the vicissitudes of a life in the U.S. Army. Destined to hold the highest possible American military rank, Marshall was not a West Point graduate but rather an alumnus of Virginia Military Institute. Young Marshall spent 14 years as a lieutenant after his graduation and commissioning in 1902, finally attaining the rank of captain in 1916. By the end of World War I, however, his tactical genius had carried him to the rank of full colonel, and only the Armistice prevented his recommended promotion to brigadier general. By 1919, George Marshall had been returned to the rank of captain; he reached colonel again in 1933, a full 15 years after the end of the First World War.

Throughout his career, Marshall sought a troop command, but often was taken from it to fill critical staff position. He did not hold a combat command during the First World War, despite his repeated request for regimental duty. Although he eventually became the highest ranking active officer in the largest Army ever fielded by the United States, Marshall never commanded troops in combat. The explanations for these events, and especially Marshall's contemporaneous opinion of them, fill this collection of his papers.

It is easy to demonstrate that Marshall's life was fascinating, that his service was vital to the survival of the Republic, and that his was an impressive role in military history. Marshall obviously is worth study—but is this the book in which to read about him? Since there are several biographies of the general in the libraries, and **Marshall: Hero for Our Times** by Leonard Mosley was recently published and is in all the book-stores, why read this scholarly collection of Marshall's letters and papers?

The answer lies in the interests of the prospective reader. The Marshall scholar, or the serious expert on the U.S. Army in the period between 1900 and 1945, needs to purchase this book. It contains much information that is uniquely insightful of Marshall and his times. The general military reader, on the other hand, who has an interest in the history of the U.S. Army and perhaps an awakened awareness of this great figure, may wish to partake of the book as well.

The contents of this book reveal not only the character and personality of Marshall, but tell us a lot about some particular aspects of the Army as well. The following quotation, taken from a letter written by then-Colonel Marshall to Maj. Gen. Heintzelman, commandant of the Command and Staff College, refers to George Marshall's experiences as an exercise commander while at the Infantry School:

"I never got the G2 business anywhere near what I thought it ought to be—generally, it was an elaborate, impractical collection of data. I read a G2 solution of a Leavenworth problem . . . in a situation depicting the second day of a war (on one of those damned river lines marking the boundary between Red and Blue states) in which fighting had occurred all day. The G2 effort was four, small, typed, printed pages! Imagine the tired distraught Division Commander on the second day of war, the first time under fire, trying to pore through such a report—if ever it could have been prepared—to find the meat of the matter."

This comment was written almost 50 years ago, on December 4, 1933, and tells us something about military intelligence then—and now. It also provides an example of how many of Marshall's observations contained in the papers published in this book continue to be relevant to the Army of today.

WO1 D.E. Renken
G2 ASIC
XVIII Airborne Corps

Thinking About National Security by Dr. Harold Brown, Hearst Books, 1983, 278 pages plus index, $17.95.

There is a tendency among the American public to perceive high level civil servants as being somehow less proficient in academic or intellectual pursuits. It is with pleasure, then, that in former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's new book, **Thinking About National Security**, the reader finds that at the very least some government officials can function exceptionally in both spheres. Calling upon his many years of government involvement and scholarly experience, Brown has produced an insightful, comprehensive exploration of the convoluted and often controversial world of the U.S. defense establishment, the external factors that influence it, and some of the internal problem that plague it. Beginning with a discussion of the Soviet Union and its impact on national security, he does a remarkably thorough yet even-handed job in handling such diverse topics as economic policies, energy, arms limitation, weapons technology, management of the Defense Department, and military manpower requirements. Each geographical region of the world is addressed in order of its perceived importance to the United States.

Europe and NATO are first discussed, followed by eastern Asia (including Japan, Korea, and the People's Republic of China)—both areas of great economic importance to the United States. Western Asia is next addressed, with the usual emphasis on oil and the Persian Gulf. A section on Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and the remainder of the Third World conclude his discussion of world regions.

Although most of Brown's geopolitical analysis is not new, aided by his special insight he does such a thorough job of addressing the almost overwhelming scope of the problem that many considerations, factors and implications that might escape the most serious student of international affairs begin to fall into place. His discussion of more technical aspects of security such as arms limitation—which he succinctly and intelligently treats—and arms technology, for which he convincingly promotes the principle that "quality is more important than quantity" is concise yet thorough.

In "Cross-Cutting Military Issues," he addresses the various aspects of naval power and

combat, then relates this to the often ignored but very serious topic of "multifront conflicts"—a major potential hazard for ourselves as well as the Soviets. In discussing the Department of Defense, national security organization, weapons procurement and service interrelationships, he goes a long way towards making the bureaucratic muddle comprehensible. Happily, he doesn't stop there, but goes on to offer suggestions that might help streamline the system. Pragmatically, he tempers his recommendations with considerations as to why certain reforms may prove difficult, impossible, or of diminishing value if achieved.

He provides convincing rationale for us not to become heavily involved in Africa, for defining a "flexible response" strategy in nuclear contingencies, for maintaining and expanding the capabilities of the Rapid Deployment Force, and for a seemingly contradictory policy of balanced arms development and arms control. He reiterates the warning that greater strategic nuclear capabilities on one or both sides is unlikely to result in increased security. He backs up a controversial statement that "the Department of Defense is . . . the most efficient and best managed of all the major departments and agencies of the U.S. government ('damning it with faint praise,' he says)," and supports increases in real defense spending while condemning the "pork barrel" approach to weapons procurement.

After detailing the problems and difficulties both within and without the nations involved, Brown advocates at least modest increases in many NATO nations' defense budgets, as well as Japan's. This would ease the burden on the United States, thereby freeing resources for response to other vital world contingencies.

The book's weak points are few, perhaps the most prominent being an insufficient emphasis on the problems of Latin America, the discussion of which is not only lumped together with that of several other regions, but is one of the shortest segments of the book—perhaps an unfortunate indication of American policy maker orientation.

Lucid and well written, **Thinking About National Security** is amazingly comprehensive, to the point that it is almost physically exhausting to read—exhausting not because it is verbose or highly technical (it is neither), but because of the immense scope of the issues and problems with which it deals. If nothing else, the book brings the reader greater appreciation for the responsibilities of and demands on those who manage our national affairs. Because of dubious aspects of the Carter Administration's foreign and defense policies, this reviewer approached a book by Carter's defense secretary with a degree of skepticism. Brown, however, has taken to his subject with such understanding and objectivity that skepticism soon disappeared. Much of the book remains, of course, opinion—but it is such informed and convincing opinion that it is well worth considering, and of value for anyone concerned about military, government or national affairs. **Thinking About National Security** promises to be one of the most important works in recent years on defense and foreign policy in—as its subtitle suggests—"a dangerous world" such as ours.

Capt. Paul H. Smith
USAICS

Miracle at Midway by Gordon W. Prange, with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1982, 469 pages, $19.95.

Prange and his associates have produced a solid work on Midway. The prose is extremely good and the research was thorough. These factors, combined with the lists of important data, make this book a first-rate reference work concerning the conduct and significance of the Battle of Midway.

As the authors indicate in the introduction, the book provides no new revelations. The book does provide a comprehensive narrative of the battle. In addition, the authors present considerable information concerning the preliminary activities, such as Pearl Harbor, Coral Sea, and an appraisal of the intelligence efforts which led to the battle; and an estimate of the significance of this complicated military action. One of the significant accomplishments of the writers is that they are able to tell a story which is easy to follow. The many facets of military activity on such a grand scale often prove to be quite difficult to relate in an intelligible manner. These three writers successfully relate the action without confusing the reader.

The conclusion of the book, however, is disappointing. The final chapter disrupts the book's overall effect. In the preceeding two chapters, the authors summarize the military lessons to be learned from the battle and provide an adequate ending. Then, with questionable justification, they add on another chapter. This final chapter adds vignettes of several of the major characters as they were when interviewed by Prange. None of the material is new and no new conclusions are added. Perhaps this section serves some sentimental value to those who knew Spruance, Nimitz, Fletcher, and Genda. In that case, the material should have been placed in an appendix. Despite the confusing ending, the book stands well as an overall reference for the Battle of Midway.

2nd Lt. Robert D. McMichael
HOC, 522nd MI Battalion, 2nd Armored Division
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The Continental Army by Robert K. Wright Jr., Army Lineage Series, ed. David F. Trask, Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 1983, 434 pages plus index.

This book is obviously the result of much painstaking research. Wright has uncovered and compiled complete organizational records of the American Revolutionary Army. An awesome conglomeration of diagrams along with excellent prose allow easy access to his research.

In the first part of the book, the author provides a brief overview of the conduct of the war. He proceeds chronologically. For each time period, he presents the military action along with all changes in the organization of the Army. The final portion of this work, about half the total number of pages, lists all known units which participated for the Revolution. The individual unit listings indicate the dates of organization and disbanding of each unit. Also included are other designations the unit had, commanders, the army by which the unit was controlled, date of capture, if appropriate, engagements in which

the unit participated, and elements of the unit still active today, if appropriate. In addition to this exhaustive data on regimental and smaller units, Wright sketches the lives of many major commanders and Army-level staff officers.

The Continental Army constitutes a reference work which will not easily be surpassed. The quite detailed research and the clear presentation of a mass of material make this book a necessity for the serious student of American military history. Wright's accomplishment is inspiring.

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The Future of Conflict in the 1980s by William J. Taylor Jr., and Steven A. Maarann, Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass., 504 pages.

The contents of this book were generated from a series of conferences held in Washington, D.C., under the auspices of the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University and Los Alamos National Laboratory, N.M. The body of the book is structured as a compendium of perspective views on past and present regional conflicts primarily in Third World nations with projected scenario forecasts for probable future conflicts. The views expressed in the book are presented by specialists from the political, economic, and scientific communities. Each of the world's regions are analyzed on a political, economic, strategic resource value, and a military basis from both Third World and superpower perspectives. Two examples of the extreme opposite perspectives from the book indicate that the nations in Latin America will have a high probability of future instability and low intensity conflicts, but paradoxically also a good future economic outlook, with the possibility for a major clash between the superpowers in Latin American region considered very unlikely.

However, on the other side of the conflict coin, the Persian Gulf and Middle East regions both have a high potential as future areas of conflict from both a regional and global plane. To emphasize this point is the tenuous and uncertain political future of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the continuing Iran-Iraq War, the threat to the oil shipping lanes in the straits of Hormuz, the conflict in Lebanon, and possible renewal of the Arab-Israeli wars, plus further Soviet expansionism in the Persian Gulf ares. All of these situations in this highly volatile area of the world could involve bringing the United States and the Soviet Union into a direct confrontation. To summarize, you come away from reading this book with a very strong impression that for the remainder of this decade, we can expect a higher level of regional type conflicts in Third World nations mainly by the use of superpower processes, plus a concomitant increased danger of these regional conflicts spilling over into larger wars eventually involving the military forces of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Michael S. Evancevich
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History of the 533rd MI Battalion

The 533rd Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI) traces its lineage back to 1952 when the 533rd MI Service Battalion was activated in Salzburg, Austria. Inactive from 1956 to 1960, it was reactivated by the merging of the 503rd MI Company and the 856th Army Security Agency Company and assigned to the 3rd Armored Division.

The 503rd (now Headquarters Company) was formed in 1951 as the 503rd MI Service Company in Tokyo. Deactivated in 1955, it reactivated in 1962 in Germany.

The 856th (currently A Company) started in 1944 as the 314th Signal Service Platoon at New Caledonia and inactivated in 1946 at Ie Shima. Two years later it was reformed as the 580th Signal Service Detachment at Fort

Greely, Alaska. In 1954 it became the 580th Signal Detachment, and then the 856th Communications Reconnaissance Detachment in Tokyo. Deactivated in 1956, it redesignated in 1960 as the 856th ASA Detachment at Fort Benning, Ga. In Vietnam, in less than five years, it received 10 unit commendations and 11 of its 12 campaign credits (the other in World War II). It was inactivated in 1971. In 1974, the 2nd EW Company, 302nd ASA Battalion in Augsburg, split into the 365th ASA Company (Provisional), and the 374th ASA Company (Provisional). In 1974, the 374th was redesignated the 856th ASA Company and was assigned to 3rd Armored Division.

The Ballad of the 533rd

Sing, O Muse, in the loftiest words,
The legend of the 533rd:
A tale to make the ladies weep,
And all the rest to fall asleep.
But nonetheless it must be heard,
The heritage of the 533rd.

'Twas long ago, an earlier day,
In the misty aisles of ASA,
Behind the Green Door and within
That our tale of valor must begin.

The Palace Puzzler blew a tube
While trying to solve his Rubik's Cube,
And, angered, cried, "I'll do away
With cubes and squares and ASA!"
Now, cubes and squares, both being pure,
He had to suffer them to endure.
But 'twas not the case for ASA,
For it was far from squared away.

So the Puzzler puzzled long and hard,
Computed printouts by the yard.
He mixed and matched TO&Es
Till his anger finally was appeased.
And then upon the Hooded Folk,
He played a diabolical joke.
But they, with grit between their teeth,
Ignored the vengence underneath,
And managed to succeed in spite
Of the Puzzle Master's oversights.

So he sent his minions overseas,
Where they spied a pair of companies.
Now one was Army and one was not,
But both became victims of the plot.

The first, an MI company,
It bore the numbers 503,
While 856, no more, no less,
Was the ASA company's address.
So the Puzzler, in a jovial mood,
Decided he'd combine the two;
Added 856 to 503,
And declared that that made 533.

In the aftermath of this addition,
He searched throughout the Third Division,
To find the leader for this mob,
And one stepped forth to take the job.
A man of guts and iron will
Who hadn't quite gone o'er the hill.
He leaped astride the noble stallion
And rode to gather his battalion.

From near and far the forces came:
The brave and the bold, the sick and the lame.
To blaze the trail, the Masters rode,
With many a slave to bear the load,
And from the land of milk and jam
The linguists came, no more to sham.
Them many a man was heard to shout,
"Yea bravo!" as the tracks rolled out.
Inquisitors materialized
'Mongst those who See without their Eyes,
And the tea-leaf reading analysts
Brought forth their templates and their lists.
The rat-men and the men of wire
Came out to light the signal fire,
While all the rest—the scribes and cooks,
The sorcerers with magic books,
And artisans who fix the broken—
Stood 'round to wait till he had spoken.

He wheeled and reared upon his steed,
And shouted out to all, "Take heed!
For this is history in the making;
The future's ours for the taking.
We've come so far, now all can see we
Can do the job, for we're the CEWI!"
And lo, he saw that it was good,
"But not good enough folks, understood?"

So to this day we sweat and strain,
Abuse our muscles and our brains,
Pursuing that elusive goal
Of getting chaos under control.
And that is our unchosen fate:
Reform and re-evaluate.
It is the debt that we've incurred,
The legacy of the 533rd.